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The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking 
Mehrsa Baradaran* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2008, the United States experienced an unprecedented financial collapse that has 
dramatically affected global financial markets and called into question banking practices and 
regulations previously thought to be sound.  Politicians and economists have cobbled together 
remedies to restore confidence in a banking system and regulatory framework that have not been 
updated since the Great Depression.  As the nature of banks, banking, and finance have changed 
drastically in the last several decades, appropriate and effective remedies to the current financial 
crisis are difficult without revisions to outdated theories and regulations governing the financial 
system.  One such theory is that banking and commerce should not mix.1  This theory was born 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University .  The 
author thanks Randall Guynn, George Sutton, Darryle Rude, Gordon Smith, Troy McKenzie, 
Daniel Matthews, Brad Lowe, and the Academic Fellows at the New York University School of 
Law.  Special thanks to Jared Bybee. 
 1. Throughout this article, I will use the term “banking” to mean a commercial bank that 
accepts deposits and makes loans—the traditional definition of bank.  Investment banking differs 
from traditional banking due to activities such as securities underwriting and brokerage arms.  
The term “commerce” refers to non-financial firms, such as retail or industrial firms whose 
primary business is not financial.  The “mixing of banking and commerce” is when banking and 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1404889
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after the Great Depression because of fears of conglomeration and abuse and enforced through 
several decades of regulation.2  However, the conglomerated nature of banking today renders 
these fears moot.   
Though the financial systems of several other countries have benefited from mixing banking 
and commerce,3 the United States has minimally tested this principle in just one area—the 
Industrial Loan Company (ILC) banking charter.  The ILC, which is the only banking charter 
that a commercial firm can operate and is authorized by only a few states, came under intense 
scrutiny in 2005 when Wal-Mart applied for an ILC charter and attempted to enter the banking 
industry.4  The commotion surrounding the ILC died down shortly after Wal-Mart withdrew its 
application in 2007, but skepticism of its value and soundness continues to remain high among 
some lawmakers and regulators.5  However, as the recent financial crisis has caused many U.S. 
 
commercial firms are affiliated, have common ownership, or when either commercial firms 
conduct banking activities or vice versa.  This article will deal primarily with bank ownership 
structure and not with the types of activities that can be conducted within a bank.  For a review 
of the debate about the mixing of commerce and banking, see Thomas F. Huertas, Can Banking 
and Commerce Mix?, 7 Cato J. 743, 743–762 (1988). 
 2. See infra Part III.B.2 and accompanying footnotes. 
 3. See Joseph G. Haubrich & João A.C. Santos, Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking with 
Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 Fin. Markets, Institutions & Instruments 
121, 123 & 159–60 (2003).   
 4. See infra Part II.C and accompanying footnotes.   
 5. See Cheyenne Hopkins & Joe Adler, Thrift Charter and ILC Option Won’t Go Down 
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banks to falter or fail, ILCs have remained sound mainly due to their stable commercial 
alliances.6  In over two decades of operation, no commercially owned ILC has caused any loss to 
the FDIC fund, largely as a result of efficient regulation and its reliance on parent commercial 
firms.7  As the traditional banking framework falters, the resilient structure and success of the 
ILC, once a banking outcast, should serve as a prototype of an emerging banking model and a 
provider of much needed stability. 
The ILC structure has been both maligned and ignored by policymakers, and treated as a 
deviant and problematic banking structure.  Recently, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd–Frank bill) issued a moratorium on new charters and cast 
doubt on their continued existence.8 The ILC structure and its ramifications to the modern state 
of banking have not been adequately studied in academic or public discourse.  It is especially 
important to examine the ILC in the aftermath of a banking collapse that has crippled the nation.   
Part II of this paper documents the background of ILCs and the current debate on ILCs, 
beginning with Wal-Mart’s infamous application in 2005, Congress’s attempts to suspend ILCs 
in 2007, and the current banking proposals addressing the ILC charter.  Part III sets forth the 
arguments waged against the ILC and challenges the idea that a separation of commerce and 
banking is necessary for financial stability.  Part IV identifies the utility and strength of the ILC 
 
Without a Fight, Am. Banker, June 17, 2009, at 1. 
 6. See infra notes 288–93 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 8. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815). 
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and the broader economic advantages of mixing commerce and banking. 
II.  INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES 
Industrial loan companies and industrial banks are FDIC-insured, state-chartered banks that 
are unique among banks in that commercial firms can own them.9  ILCs are similar to 
commercial banks in the activities they are able to conduct, their management, and their 
regulatory structure.10  Under current law, a commercial company, such as Wal-Mart or Ford 
Motor Company (Ford), cannot own a retail bank.11  With an ILC charter, however, a 
commercial company can own an “industrial bank,”12 which in practice has most of the powers 
of retail banks, including deposit-taking and lending.  Industrial banks are chartered under an 
exception to the federal Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act), which allows commercial 
companies to own industrial banks without the restrictions that generally apply to Bank Holding 
 
 9. See Mindy West, The FDIC’s Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Historical 
Perspective, Supervisory Insights, Summer 2004, at 5, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum04/sisum04.pdf. 
 10. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-621, Industrial Loan Corporations: 
Recent Asset Growth and Commercial Interest Highlight Differences in Regulatory 
Authority (2005) [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
 11. The Bank Holding Company Act states that a company that controls a bank must not 
engage in non-banking activities.  12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2006).   
 12. Utah law was amended in 2004 and now refers to ILCs as industrial banks.  Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-8-21 (West 2009).  This article will refer to this entity as the “ILC” as the term is more 
widely used among legislators and commentators.   
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Companies (BHCs).  This exception also allows these commercial companies to own these banks 
without being subject to federal consolidated bank supervision.13   
Only seven states have chartered industrial banks in the past: Utah, Nevada, California, 
Hawaii, Colorado, Minnesota, and Indiana.14  However, most of these no longer permit the 
chartering of ILCs or do not have a system in place to regulate them.15  Utah has become the 
home of ILCs and has chartered and regulated virtually all ILCs established in the last two 
 
 13. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5227 (Feb. 
5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 354) (notice).  By using the term “Federal Consolidated 
Bank Supervision,” I refer to the supervision provided by either the Federal Reserve Board or the 
Office of Thrift Supervision.  The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLB) of 1999 gives the Federal 
Reserve supervision over BHCs and Financial Holding Companies (FHC’s).  Pub. L. No. 106-
102, tit. I, 113 Stat. 1338, 1370 (1999).  A firm that is a holding company for a non-BHC Act 
bank is not a BHC and is not subject to Federal Consolidated Bank Supervision.  12 U.S.C. § 
1813(a)(2) (2006). 
 14. See Industrial Loan Companies: A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 19 (2006) (statement of Douglas H. Jones, 
Acting General Counsel, FDIC) [hereinafter Jones Statement]; H.R. Rep. No. 110-155, at 9 
(2007).   
 15. Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. at 522 n.33; see 
generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 10, see also H.R. Rep. No. 110-155, 
supra note 14, at 10.   
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decades.16  ILCs are state-chartered banks and “state nonmember banks,” and their primary 
federal banking supervisor is the FDIC, pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI 
Act).17  The FDIC regulates ILCs with the same authority and procedure it uses to supervise 
other banks.18   
Ironically, opposition to the ILC stemmed from its popularity rather than from any inherent 
problem in the industry.19  At their inception, industrial banks focused on small consumer loans 
in local markets.20  Today, many large international companies control industrial banks and use 
 
 16. George Sutton, Industrial Banks, 56 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 178, 179 (2002); see GAO 
Report, supra note 10, at 16. 
 17. West, supra note 9, at 5. 
 18. Jones Statement, supra note 14, at 9. 
 19. In his address to Congress as they were deliberating the suspension of the ILC charter, 
Utah Commissioner Edward Leary stated: 
I believe that I am here today because of the success of th[e] regulatory model, not its 
failure.  . . . I am told the articulated threat which warrants passage of this bill is a 
potential threat of misuse of the charter by holding companies which are non-financially 
oriented. This bill seeks to remove a potential threat even before the threat materialized 
or manifests itself. 
The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 698 Before the H. Comm. 
on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 17 (2007) (testimony of G. Edward Leary, Utah Comm’r of 
Fin. Institutions) [hereinafter Leary Testimony]. 
 20. Christian Johnson & George G. Kaufman, A Bank By Any Other Name …, 31 Econ. 
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them to support their complex business transactions and financial operations.21  In the last 
decade, ILCs experienced an exponential growth of assets and deposits held.22  Proponents of the 
ILC feel that the expansion of the ILC model is indicative of its success and of the market need 
for such entities.23  Opponents of the charter, a group that emerged to oppose Wal-Mart’s 
proposed ILC a few years ago,24 claim that the mixing of banking and commerce, uniquely 
allowed through the ILC charter, increases systemic risk to the financial system25 and can lead to 
harmful concentrations of power.26  In Part III, I will address each of these arguments and several 
 
Persp. (Fed Res. of Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.), Fourth Quarter 2007, at 37, 41 available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2007/ep_4qtr2007
_part3_johnson_etal.pdf.  
 21. See id. at 42; GAO Report, supra note 10, at 16.  
 22. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 16. 
 23. See generally ILCs—A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
109th Cong. 51–52 (2006) (testimony of George Sutton on behalf of the Securities Industry 
Association) [hereinafter Sutton Testimony]. 
 24. See H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., At Issue: Retailers Purchasing Industrial Loan 
Companies (ILCs) (May 2, 2007), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/RetailersInBanking.html. 
 25. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 29–30; Arthur  E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the 
Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1539, 1588 (2007) 
 26. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 
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others, and I will propose that they are largely without merit and are not supported by history or 
empirical studies.  In Part IV, I discuss the advantages of mixing banking and commerce and 
demonstrate that the ILC should not be suspended, but rather used as a model to shape future 
banking regulation.   
A. History of ILC Formation 
Historically, ILCs were state-chartered banks organized to give loans to industrial workers 
who were not being served by other creditors.27  Arthur Morris established the first ILC in 1910, 
and it operated much like a finance company.28  These early ILCs were not permitted by law to 
accept “deposits” but, instead, could issue something similar to a deposit called a “thrift 
certificate” to avoid the term.29  A crucial difference was that these thrift certificates were not 
eligible for FDIC deposit insurance.30   
In 1982, the ILC industry changed dramatically when the Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act (Garn-St. Germain Act) formally acknowledged thrift certificates and made them 
eligible for federal deposit insurance.31  Some states, including Utah and California, responded 
 
to Tim Johnson, U.S. Sen. (June 25, 2003), 2003 Fed. Res. Super. Ltrs. LEXIS 17; see also GAO 
Report, supra note 10, at 18–21.  See generally Wilmarth, supra note 25. 
 27. See West, supra note 9, at 8. 
 28. See id. at 7.   
 29. Id. at 8. 
 30. See id.  
 31. Id. at 8; see Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 
Stat. 1469. 
2010] The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking 109 
by requiring ILCs to obtain FDIC insurance in order to keep their charters.32  As a condition to 
receiving FDIC insurance, many ILCs were required to increase credit quality and meet other 
measures of general bank soundness.33  After ILCs received FDIC insurance, demand for the 
charter increased.34  
In the mid-1980s, ILCs and other “non-bank” charters, which functioned as banks but were 
not subject to the BHC Act, became popular35 because they allowed their parent corporations to 
engage in “non-banking” activities.36  Congress responded in 1987 with the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act (CEBA), which brought many of these non-banks under the umbrella of 
the BHC Act.37  CEBA declared that all banks insured by the FDIC were “banks” and thus 
subject to the BHC Act and all of its activity restrictions,38 which forced them to cease any non-
 
 32. See West, supra note 9, at 8. 
 33. See id.  
 34. See id. at 9. 
 35. Id.  According to the definition of “bank” under the BHC Act, a bank had to both make 
loans and accept deposits.  By only engaging in one of these tasks, an entity could fall outside the 
BHC Act’s definition and therefore avoid being subject to the Act.  These entities became known 
as “non-bank banks” and were still eligible for FDIC insurance.  Id. at 9 n.10.  
 36. Id. at 9. 
 37. See id.; Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101 Stat. 
552, 554 (defining banks as institutions insured by the FDIC or that accept demand deposits and 
make commercial loans). 
 38. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(A) (2006) (defining “bank” under the BHC Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) 
110 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63 
banking activity.39  However, CEBA provided a specific exception for ILCs, making ILCs one of 
the only non-bank alternatives available for commercial firms.40  Thus, pursuant to CEBA, an 
ILC is not a “bank” for purposes of the BHC Act if it meets one of the following conditions: (1) 
the institution “does not accept demand deposits,” (2) the institution’s total assets are less than 
$100,000,000, or (3) no company has acquired control of the institution after August 10, 1987.41   
It was CEBA’s ILC exception that caused the boom in the ILC industry because CEBA made 
the ILC the only available banking option for commercial firms.42  The first application for a 
commercially owned ILC was filed with the FDIC in 1988, and many others followed.43  The 
industry grew rapidly and without controversy until Wal-Mart applied for an ILC charter.44  In 
 
(2006) (defining “insured bank”). 
 39. The BHC Act states that a company controls another if it (1) has direct or indirect 
ownership, control, or power to vote 25% or more of any class of voting securities of that 
company; (2) is able in any manner to elect a majority of the directors of that company; or (3) is 
able to exercise, directly or indirectly, a controlling influence over that company as determined 
by the Board.  12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2). 
 40. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H). 
 41. Id. § 1813(a)(2). 
 42. See West, supra note 9, at 9.  See generally O. Emre Ergungor & James B. Thomson, 
Industrial Loan Companies, Econ. Comment. (Federal Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio), 
Oct. 1, 2006, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Commentary/2006/1001.pdf. 
 43. See West, supra note 9, at 9. 
 44. See Alexander Raskovich, Should Banking Be Kept Separate from Commerce 1 (U.S. 
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response to Wal-Mart’s application, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) expressed 
concerns about industrial banks45 and questioned, among other things, whether the FDIC’s 
supervisory authority was sufficient to protect industrial banks.46  However, the extensive GAO 
report did not reveal any inherent risks in the ILC industry.47  Lawrence J. White, an NYU 
professor and former member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), stated in his 
prepared testimony for Congressional hearings on July 12, 2006, that “[i]t is surely no secret that 
the event that has drawn such extensive public attention to the existence of ILC charters has been 
Wal-Mart’s application to obtain a Utah ILC charter and FDIC deposit insurance for its ILC.”48  
He referred to Wal-Mart’s application as the “900 pound gorilla in the room.”49  Notably, Target, 
Nordstrom, and many other large commercial firms obtained federal deposit insurance without 
any controversy prior to Wal-Mart’s application.50   
 
Dep’t of Justice, Econ. Analysis Grp., EAG 08-8, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/236665.pdf. 
 45. See generally GAO Report, supra note 10. 
 46. See id. at 21. 
 47. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
 48. ILCs—A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th 
Cong. 218 (2006) (testimony of Lawrence J. White) [hereinafter White Testimony]. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Liz Pulliam Weston, National Bank of Wal-Mart?, MSN Money, 
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Banking/Betterbanking/P109171.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 
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B. The Growth of the ILC 
The ILC industry experienced dramatic growth for two decades.51  Between 1987 and 2007, 
industrial bank total assets grew from $4.2 billion to over $243 billion.52  The growth resulted 
largely from non-BHC financial firms opening ILCs to serve their banking needs and several 
commercial firms using ILCs to service their various consumer needs.53  By far, Utah saw the 
largest increase in ILC assets during this period and increased its market share of ILC assets 
from 11% to 82%.54   
 
2010). 
 51. Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 698 Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs.,110th Cong. 126 (2007) (statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.) [hereinafter Kohn Testimony; see also GAO Report, 
supra note 10, at 16. 
 52. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5218 (Feb. 
5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 354) (notice); John Daley, Utah’s industrial banks appear 
“Safe and Sound,” KSL (Sep. 16, 2008, 5:00 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=1488sid=4280214. 
 53. Of the twenty-seven ILCs operating in Utah today, eight are considered to have a 
commercial parent company.  See G. Edward Leary, Utah Comm’r of Fin. Institutions, Remarks 
before Utah Ass’n of Fin. Servs. 3 (Aug. 25, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.dfi.utah.gov/PDFiles/IB%20Speech%202006.pdf) [hereinafter Leary Remarks]. 
 54. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 19–20.  Most ILCs have been established in Utah 
because the state is perceived as “business-friendly” to ILCs and Utah’s usury laws are more 
desirable for the ILC business.  Id. at 16, 19.   
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Many ILC opponents expressed concern about this dramatic growth because they perceived 
the ILC industry to be growing at a threatening rate.55  However, at its height, the entire ILC 
industry was only about 1.5% of the banking industry.56  The growth of the ILC, however, was 
and is indicative of its increased popularity for large commercial and financial firms.57  ILCs 
were growing because they provided the only way for their commercial parents to participate in 
certain financing activities that they viewed as cost-effective and complimentary to the 
marketing of their other products.58   
However, that growth has been halted by the recent financial crisis, which has caused many 
investment banks and credit card companies to seek BHC status and convert their ILCs into 
 
 55. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 16. 
 56. Leary Remarks, supra note 53, at 2; see ILCs—A Review of Charter, Ownership, and 
Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 22 (2006) (testimony of G. Edward Leary, Utah 
Comm’r of Fin. Institutions), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/071206gel.pdf; see also Fed. Res. Bd., Rep. on the 
Condition of the U.S. Banking Industry: Third Quarter, 2005 (2006), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/bank_condition/default.htm. 
 57. Kenneth Spong & Eric Robbins, Industrial Loan Companies: A Growing Industry Sparks a 
Public Policy Debate, Econ. Rev. (Federal Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri), Fourth 
Quarter 2007, at 41, 43, 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/PDF/4q07Spong.pdf. 
 58. Id.  
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state-chartered banks.59  This change has caused a contraction in the ILC sector, which has 
shrunk from a high of $243 billion in assets in June 2008 to $104 billion in September 2009.60  
The continued growth of ILCs is uncertain, as their future depends on whether and how 
policymakers decide to change the industry.61  Most of the large investment banks that formerly 
dominated the ILC world applied for BHC status to gain access to Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) funds and the Federal Reserve’s discount window, but also, and perhaps more 
 
 59. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Shift for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of an 
Era, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2008, at A1.  In order to comply with the BHC, many of these firms 
will convert their ILCs into state-chartered banks.  GMAC has already converted its ILC to a 
Utah-chartered state bank.  Press Release, GMAC Fin. Servs., GMAC Financial Services Bank 
Holding Company Application Approved by Federal Reserve (Dec. 24, 2008), available at 
http://media.gmccfs.com/index.php?s=43&item=298.  Goldman Sachs has converted its ILC into 
a New York state-chartered bank.  Goldman Sachs Gets N.Y. Banking License, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 28, 2008, at B2; Jeff Bater, Fed Waives 5-Day Waiting Period on Goldman, Morgan 
Stanley, Real Time Economics (Sept. 22, 2008, 12:02 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/09/22/fed-waives-5-day-waiting-period-on-goldman-
morgan-stanley/. 
 60. E-mail from Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the State of Utah, to author 
(Dec. 2, 2009, 15:20 MST) (on file with the SMU Law Review). 
 61. Jonathan Stempel, Obama regulatory plan hits industrial loan cos, Reuters (June 19, 2009, 
8:07 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1943466520090619. 
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importantly, to increase investor confidence.62  These firms include financial giants, such as 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, American Express, GMAC, and CIT, among others.63  
Because these large investment banks participate in some “commercial activities,” such as 
merchant banking, these banks were not regulated by the Federal Reserve, were not considered 
BHCs, and could not own or operate banks.64  However, these investment banks are basically 
“shadow banks,” engaged in financial activity with similar risks and liabilities as traditional 
banks but with added risk due to their highly leveraged business model.65  By becoming BHCs, 
the firms are agreeing to increased federal oversight and activity restrictions, such as higher 
 
 62. See generally Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59.  At least one firm that has experienced 
success in owning an ILC reportedly converted to a BHC in order to participate more fully in 
banking.  Robert Barba, For This REIT, Bank Status Is Worth the Tax, Am. Banker, Jan. 2, 
2009, at 1. 
 63. See generally Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59; Press Release, GMAC Fin. Servs., supra note 
59.   
 64. In 1999, the GLB Act allowed investment banks, for the first time since the Great 
Depression, to engage in commercial activities and “merchant banking” endeavors.  See 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 122, 113 Stat. 1338, 1381 (1999); Sen. 
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Fin. Servs. Modernization Act, Gramm–
Leach–Bliley, Summary of Provisions, http://banking.senate.gov/conf/grmleach.htm (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
 65. See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. 
Rev. 183, 195 (2009). 
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capital reserves and lower risk profiles.66   
The new wave of conversions of investment banks to BHCs has focused the ILC debate on 
commercial firm ownership of ILCs and highlights the need for clearer regulation addressing the 
separation of banking and commerce.67  This article focuses primarily on commercial firm 
 
 66. See Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59.  But most industry observers do not expect to see major 
changes to the operations of these firms and even expect that the change is temporary and that 
the firms will try to shed their BHC status when the market becomes more stable.  Steven Sloan, 
Can Even Fed Oversight Alter Investment Banking Giants?, Am. Banker, Feb. 2, 2009, at 1. 
 67. The Department of the Treasury has already released a “Blueprint” for revised regulation 
that deals specifically with the BHC Act.  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Blueprint for a 
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 164 (2008) [hereinafter Treasury Blueprint], 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.  As financial institutions 
increasingly become BHCs, Congress will need to decide whether it will lift some BHC Act 
restrictions to allow these firms to engage in commercial activity as they have done in the past or 
solidify the separation of commerce and banking within these large investment banks.  Sloan, 
supra note 66, at 1.  The Treasury has recently suggested that some of the rigid activity 
restrictions of the BHC Act on financial firms be lifted and that a new regulatory framework of 
broad federal oversight be implemented.  The Treasury proposed allowing commercial firms to 
own banks in a blueprint aimed at revamping financial regulation in April 2008, but it is unlikely 
that such a plan would be approved in the near future.  The Treasury Blueprint outlined a new 
regulatory regime that would have increased supervision of all banking affiliates.  See generally 
Treasury Blueprint, supra.  See Joe Adler, Paulson Plan Would Open Charters to All Comers; 
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ownership of ILCs and not on investment banking for several reasons.  First, as mentioned, most 
investment banks that owned ILCs have now become BHCs and are no longer dominant players 
in the ILC field.68  Second, as the massive conversion of investment banks to BHCs 
demonstrates, there is a blurry distinction between investment banking and commercial 
banking—often, the activities of investment banks were primarily financial in nature and, thus, 
not dissimilar to the activities conducted in their ILCs.69  This article seeks to highlight the 
advantages of commercial ownership of banks and the advantages of a diversified ownership 
model in banking.  An investment bank has a similar business model to a BHC, which is run 
similarly to a bank, and does not add diversity across sectors, as opposed to a retail or industrial 
owner of a bank whose business operations and vulnerabilities differ greatly from a bank and can 
offer balance and support to their subsidiary.70   
This article does not address the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLB), which allowed for the 
mixing of banking and commerce that created these investment banking entities.  The GLB 
allowed traditional financial institutions to engage in various commercial activities, such as 
 
Banking-Commerce Divide Would End, Fed Would Add Oversight, Am. Banker, Apr. 3, 2008, 
at 1.  
 68. See generally Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59. 
 69. See Knowledge@Wharton, Banking Reform Proposals: Why They Miss the Mark, 
Financial Times (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1567488. 
 70. See Christine E. Blair, The Mixing of Banking and Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16 
FDIC Banking Rev., no. 4, 2004 at 97, 101–02 (2004), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/Banking/2005;an/article3.pdf. 
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securities and insurance underwriting.71  The wisdom of this expansion has recently been 
challenged but is beyond the scope of this article.  Although the term “separation of banking and 
commerce” has been used to describe restrictions on bank activities (what a bank can do) and on 
bank ownership structure (who can own a bank), this article only addresses the latter.  
C. The Wal-Mart Application 
The ILC industry operated quietly in the banking world until 2005 when Wal-Mart filed its 
application to open an ILC.72  Wal-Mart intended to use an ILC to service its credit card 
transactions in-house to save the 2% to 3% that it paid to a third-party server.73  However, Wal-
Mart’s application drew criticism from the banking industry, policymakers, and consumer 
groups.74  On June 8, 2006, ninety-eight members of Congress wrote to the FDIC to request a 
 
 71. See Sen. Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, supra note 64.  
 72. See Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,531, 10,532 
(Mar. 1, 2006) (public hearing notice) [hereinafter Wal-Mart FDIC Application]; Shaheen Pasha, 
Coming soon: A Wal-Mart Bank?, CNN/Money (Oct. 27, 2005, 2:24 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/27/news/economy/walmart_banks/. 
 73. According to the application filed with the FDIC, the bank will provide Wal-Mart with 
access to the Automated Clearing House network so that they can process checks and debit card 
transactions.  See Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, supra note 72.  The 
application also states that Wal-Mart will be the bank’s only customer and the bank will not seek 
out additional customers.  Id.; see Pasha, supra note 72; see also David Breitkopf, Wal-Mart’s 
Financial Vision: In Payments; Spotlight on An ILC’s Role, Am. Banker, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1.  
 74. See Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1, 
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moratorium on approvals of commercially owned industrial banks until Congress could consider 
the continued viability of the ILC charter.75  The FDIC subsequently imposed a six-month 
moratorium on July 28, 2006,76 and extended it several times before it finally expired on January 
31, 2008.77  Although the FDIC expressed the opinion that the ILC industry was sound,  it issued 
 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/business/17bank.html; see also Letter from 
Camden R. Fine, President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., to Donald E. Powell, 
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. and John F. Carter, Reg’l Dir., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 6 
(Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/ltr081805.pdf [hereinafter ICBA 
Letter]. 
 75. Banking: Representative Roscoe Bartlett, Representative Roscoe Bartlett 
http://bartlett.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=2047 (last visited Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter 
Bartlett Statement]; see Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 698 
Before the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, 
Chairman, FDIC) [hereinafter Bair Statement]. 
 76. Bartlett Statement, supra note 75. Roscoe bartlett “Reps. Frank and Gillmor, joined by 115 
other Members of Congress, wrote to the FDIC on December 7, 2006 and requested that the 
moratorium be extended.”  Statement of Banking Representative Roscoe Bartlett.  For a 
complete description of FDIC action since the announcement of the first moratorium, see Bair 
Statement, supra note 75, at 10.   
 77. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5219–20 
(proposed Feb. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 354); Joe Adler, As Moratorium Ends, 
Few ILC Seekers Left to Fight, Am. Banker, Jan. 31 2008, at 1. 
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the moratorium to pass the difficult and controversial decision of what to do with Wal-Mart’s 
application on to Congress.78  As the FDIC explained in a statement, “the original moratorium 
demonstrated that the growth of the ILC industry, the trend toward commercial company 
 
 78. The FDIC testified that there are no inherent problems in the ILC charter.  Bair Statement, 
supra note 77, at 10.  Comptroller John Dugan, a member of the FDIC board, expressed his 
opinion in a board meeting as follows: 
In short, denying an ILC application for deposit insurance based merely on 
commercial affiliation would be fundamentally inconsistent with first, the express 
congressional exemption of ILCs from the Bank Holding Company Act’s 
restriction on commercial affiliation, and second, the FDIC’s track record in 
addressing risks raised by such affiliations during the last 20 years.  The 
continued ability of commercial firms to own ILCs will undoubtedly be a close 
and difficult policy decision for Congress, but it is not a close decision for me as a 
legal determination to be made by this agency.  As a result, if Congress fails to 
change the law permitting commercial ownership of ILCs during the extension of 
the moratorium, and if a deposit insurance application is submitted thereafter by 
an ILC with commercial affiliations, I will not vote to deny the application merely 
because of that affiliation.  In the meantime, I strongly urge Congress to address 
this issue. John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Statement to the FDIC 
Board of Directors Regarding the ILC Moratorium Extension 4 (Jan. 31, 2007), 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2007/pub-other-state-
2007-aa.pdf [hereinafter Dugan Statement]. 
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ownership of ILCs and the nature of some ILC business models have raised significant questions 
about the risks to the deposit insurance fund.”79  According to the FDIC, the moratorium 
“provide[s] Congress with an opportunity to address the issue legislatively while the FDIC 
considers how best to respond to any safety and soundness issues surrounding commercial 
ownership under existing law.”80 
To say that Wal-Mart’s application was “controversial” would be an understatement.  After 
the FDIC’s moratorium, Congress received more than 13,800 letters regarding Wal-Mart’s 
proposed ILC.81  Most comments were in direct opposition to Wal-Mart being granted a charter, 
but some also raised concern about the ILC industry in general.82  In May 2007, the House 
passed legislation that would suspend any further commercial ownership of ILCs.83  During the 
eighteen month FDIC moratorium, however, Wal-Mart conceded to the massive opposition and 
 
 79. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Extends Moratorium on Industrial Loan 
Company Applications by Commercial Companies for One Year; Will Move Forward on 
Applications from Financial Companies (Jan. 31, 2007), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2007/pro7007.html. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Moratorium on Certain Industrial Bank Applications and Notices, 72 Fed. Reg. 5290, 
5291–92 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Adler, supra note 77, at 1.  This legislation as well as Senate Legislation on ILCs will be 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
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withdrew its application.84  Home Depot, along with several other commercial firms, also 
withdrew its application, taking the momentum away from the ILC opposition.85   
Jane Thompson, president of Wal-Mart Financial Services, justified the withdrawal, stating 
that “[s]ince the approval process is now likely to take years rather than months, we decided to 
withdraw our application to better focus on other ways to serve customers.”86  The FDIC and 
other federal regulators welcomed the news.87  FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair stated that “Wal-
Mart made a wise choice.  This decision will remove the controversy surrounding their 
intentions.”88  Others, including the American Bankers Association (ABA) remained 
apprehensive of the ILC charter and called for change, stating that “Wal-Mart’s withdrawal of its 
ILC application is a welcome development, but we urge Congress to continue its work to close 
the ILC loophole once and for all.  The central concern in the ILC debate—the separation 
between banking and commerce—remains, even with today’s announcement.”89   
 
 84. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5218–19 
(Feb. 5, 2007); Parija B. Kavilanz, Wal-Mart withdraws industrial banking push, CNN/Money 
(Mar. 16, 2007, 12:30 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/16/news/companies/walmart/index.htm. 
 85. Adler, supra note 67, at 1.  Of the fourteen pending applications before the moratorium, 
only three remained.  “[O]nly one—Chrysler Financial’s, involve[d] a commercial parent.”  Id. 
 86. Kavilanz, supra note 84. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Wal-Mart Drops Bid to Form Bank, Ins. J. (Mar. 16, 2007), 
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It was Wal-Mart’s suspected desire to enter full-scale banking that drove the opposition to 
both its application and the ILC industry.90  Many worried that despite its stated intention, Wal-
Mart planned to open a national bank that could drive traditional retail banks out of business by 
offering competitive pricing on its financial products.91  Although banking law would potentially 
allow such an expansion,92  Wal-Mart stated, before dropping their bid, that it would be willing 
to accept a charter that prohibited any future branching.93  Despite the company’s denials that it 
did not intend to establish banking branches or engage in lending,94 the fears that it would do so 
 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/03/16/77810.htm. 
 90. Liza Featherstone, The Bank of Wal-Mart?, The Nation (Aug. 31, 2005), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/bank-wal-mart. 
 91. See ICBA Letter, supra note 74, at 2–4. 
 92. According to Utah law, after three years, an ILC is no longer bound to their original 
business plan, and if the board approves a change, the ILC charter could be amended to include 
national branching.  See 12 C.F.R. § 333.101(a) (2007).  The amendment to the charter would 
also have to be approved by the FDIC.  Wal-Mart’s ILC could potentially branch into twenty-
two states that either allow the ILC charter or have agreed to the opt-in provisions under the 
Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994.  Lloyd, infra note 94, at 226. 
 93. See Industrial Loan Companies and Industrial Banks, 71 Fed. Reg. 49,456, 49,458 (Aug. 
23, 2006); Lloyd, infra note 94, at 227. 
 94. Rob Garver, Wal-Mart’s Financial Vision: In Retail: Focus on Unbanked, Partnerships, 
Home Grown ATMs, Am. Banker, Oct. 5. 2005, at 1.  “According to Jane Thompson, the 
President of Wal-Mart Financial Services, Wal-Mart had no desire to establish branches or 
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appear to be somewhat justified. Wal-Mart has attempted to enter banking, in one form or 
another, for over a decade.95  Moreover, Wal-Mart already operates a full service bank in 
Mexico,96 and many fear that it will do the same in the United States because of its repeated 
attempts to enter banking.97  Wal-Mart could have a damaging effect on community banking 
 
engage in lending, and the ILC was ‘not a bank a consumer [would] ever see.’ In addition, 
Thompson pointed out that Wal-Mart actively encourages community banks to open branches in 
its stores.”  Zachariah J. Lloyd, Waging War with Wal-Mart: A Cry for Change Threatens the 
Future of Industrial Loan Corporations, 14 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 211, 227 (2008) 
(citations omitted).  “Wal-Mart currently has arrangements with more than 300 banks, which 
operate more than 1,100 branches in Wal-Mart stores across the country.” Garver, supra, at 1. 
 95. Kevin K. Nolan, Wal-Mart’s Industrial Loan Company: The Risk to Community Banks, 
10 N.C. Banking Inst. 187, 191–92 (2006) 
 (describing various attempts by Wal-Mart to purchase banks in Oklahoma, California, and a 
national bank chain, TD Bank, all of which having been blocked by state or national regulators); 
see also Bloomberg News, Wal-Mart Wants To Buy Savings and Loan, N.Y. Times, June 30, 
1999, at C31.  
 96. Carolyn Whelan, Wal-Mart gets its bank—in Mexico, CNN/Money (Jan. 29, 2008, 4:08 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/28/news/international/walmart_bank.fortune/index.htm. 
 97. Wal-Mart attempted once before to establish a California ILC, but the California 
legislature, in an obvious attempt to target Wal-Mart, passed legislation barring commercial 
ownership of ILCs.  Rob Blackwell, Wal-Mart After ILC Again, This Time in Utah Met with 
FDIC, ICBA; Top Exec. Said Picked for Card-Focused Unit, Am. Banker, Mar. 8, 2005, at 1; 
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should it choose to enter banking and use predatory pricing as it has in the past.98  The anti-
 
Christine Daleiden, Wal-Mart: The Debate over Commercial Ownership of Industrial Loan 
Companies, 11 Mar. Haw. Bar J.23; 25–26 (2007); see also Nicola Leiter, Wal-Mart’s 
Industrial Loan Company, 25 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 101, 101–02 (2006).   
 98. Camden Fine, President of the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA): 
“Fifteen years ago, Wal-Mart said it had no designs on the grocery business and 20 years ago, 
they said they had no designs on the hardware business but now they dominate both businesses.” 
Lloyd, supra note 94, at 227–28 (citing Shaheen Pasha); Wal-Mart Bank faces tough opposition, 
CNN/Money (Jan. 4, 2006, 1:46 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/04/news/companies/walmart_bank/).  Through their use of 
“predatory pricing and other techniques,” they tend to “run all local competition out of business.” 
Id. at 227 (citing Letter from Sound Banking Coalition to John F. Carter, Reg’l Dir., Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. 6 (Aug. 17, 2005), 
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/sbc081705.pdf).  “Typically, after Wal-Mart expands 
into another sector of the market and reduces local competition—or does away with it entirely—
Wal-Mart frequently increases its own prices.”  Id. at 228 (citing Nolan, supra note 95, at 194).  
“An Iowa State University study revealed that after Wal-Mart’s expansion into Iowa, 555 
grocery stores, 298 hardware stores, 293 building materials stores, and 116 drug stores closed 
their doors.”  Id.; see also Kenneth E. Stone, Competing with the Discount Mass 
Merchandisers, 23 tbl. 2 (1995), available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/stone/1995_IA_WM_Study.pdf (as cited in Lloyd, supra 
note 94, at 228).  Other studies indicate that “for every Wal-Mart ‘Supercenter’ opened, two 
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competitive fears of a hypothetical Wal-Mart national bank have driven much of the opposition 
to the ILC charter,99 but the arguments waged against the ILC have focused on safety and risk 
concerns, which if legitimate would be a valid reason to discontinue the charter.100  This Article 
will address these arguments and show that they are not legitimate.  If Wal-Mart were to operate 
a national bank, it may pose a significant competitive risk to community banking but would be 
among the safest banks in the country because it would be backed by a large, highly capitalized, 
and stable commercial giant.101   
 
local groceries will close.”  Id. at 228–29 (citing Nolan, supra note 95, at 194).  Therefore, Nolan 
concludes, a Wal-Mart ILC could damage “the community banking industry (if a Wal-Mart ILC 
charter is amended to include full retail banking services) in each of its Supercenters nationwide.  
Id. at 229 (citing Nolan, supra note 95, at 194.)   
 99. See Wendy Zellner, Wal-Mart: Your New Banker?, Bloomberg Businessweek (Feb. 5, 
2007), available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_06/63919046_mz011.htm; see also 
Michelle Clark Neely, Industrial Loan Companies Come Out of the Shadows, The Reg’l 
Economist (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.), July 2007, 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=27. 
 100. See Neely, supra note 99. 
 101. See Suzanne Struglinski & Jenifer K. Nii, Wal-Mart bank delayed, Deseret News, Feb. 1, 
2007, at E1; see also Letter from David B. Winder, member of Bd. Of Dirs. For Wal-Mart Bank, 
to Sheila C. Bair, chairman of Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Oct. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2006/06c100ilc.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2010). 
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D. Congressional Legislation  
The House Committee on Financial Services (Committee) held a hearing in 2006 regarding 
industrial banks.102  The general counsels from the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board, as well 
as many other industry observers, testified before the Committee, discussing many facets of 
industrial banks.103  In May 2007, the House passed the Industrial Bank Holding Company Act 
of 2007 (H.R. 698), which prohibited commercial firms from acquiring ILCs, by a vote of 371–
16.104  Under the bill, a company is considered “commercial if it derive[s] 15% or more of its 
gross revenue, on a consolidated basis, from non-financial activities.”105  H.R. 698 also gave the 
 
 102. Industrial Loan Companies: A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. 
on Financial Services, 109th 1 Cong. (2006). 
 103. Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5219 (Feb. 5, 
2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 86.).   
 104. Press Release, H. Comm. on Financial Services, House Overwhelmingly Passes Industrial 
Bank Holding Company Act (May 21, 2007), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/press110/press052107.shtml.  See H.R. 698, 110th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2007).  Congressman Gillmor and Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank 
introduced H.R. 698 on January 29, 2007.  Press Release, H. Com. On Financial Services, supra.  
Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate.  See S. 1356, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). 
 105. H.R. 698 also exempts commercial companies that already own ILCs from this prohibition 
under a grandfather provision.  See H.R. Rep. No. 110-155, at 9 (2007); see also H.R. 698, 
110th Cong. § 51(c), (f)(2)–(3) (1st Sess. 2007). 
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FDIC supervisory authority over any parent company of an ILC.106   
The Senate did not respond with similar legislation at the time and the FDIC’s moratorium 
expired on January 31, 2008, but was subsequently re-installed by the Dodd–Frank bill.107  
Several states also enacted legislation that would prohibit or restrict ILCs chartered in other 
states from establishing branches in their states.108  The broader financial collapse has focused 
 
 106. H.R. 698; see H.R. Rep. No. 110–115, at 9. 
 107. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815).  In February 2008, 
Senator Dodd attempted to approve a bill in the Senate Banking Committee that would ban 
commercial ownership of ILCs.  Legislative Update, Am. Banker, Feb. 14, 2008, at 7.  The bill 
did not gain enough votes to pass the committee and, if revisited, is unlikely to pass on the floor 
of the Senate for several reasons.  First, the moratorium allowed the FDIC to evade the decision 
completely rather than merely delaying it because Wal-Mart dropped its bids and thus deflated 
the controversy surrounding ILCs.  Alder, supra note 77, at 1.  Second, the bill included a large 
exemption for automakers, which happen to be the only type of commercial firm currently 
seeking ILC charters, thereby making the legislation a symbolic gesture.  Id.  This huge 
exemption seems to suggest that the opposition was aimed at Wal-Mart rather than at ILCs.  
Given the current economic climate, it is unlikely that the government would deny automakers 
charters for ILCs because it could provide them needed liquidity.  A May 2, 2007 mark-up of the 
passed House legislation also included a large exception for automakers.  See Legislative 
Update, Am. Banker, May 10, 2007, at 7. 
 108. Lloyd, supra note 94, at 232 n.151.  These states are Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Wisconsin, 
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lawmakers on more comprehensive banking reform, making it unlikely that an act targeted at a 
particular banking charter will be discussed in the legislature.  However, the ILC was discussed 
in the proposed White House and Senate bills addressing broad banking changes and was part of 
the Dodd–Frank reform package.109   
E. White House and Senate Legislation 
On June 17, 2009, the Obama administration released a comprehensive plan for regulatory 
reform, which proposed an extensive overhaul of bank regulation and regulatory structure.110  As 
part of the plan, referred to as “The White Papers,” the administration proposed a stricter 
separation of banking and commerce as well as a complete ban of the ILC charter.111  The final 
Dodd–Frank bill, which was passed in July 2010, issued a three-year moratorium on new ILC 
charters and directed the GAO to conduct a study on the ILC charter to determine its safety and 
 
Virginia, and Vermont.  Wal-Mart’s Industrial Loan Company Talking Points,Wal-Mart 
Watch, http://walmartwatch.com/img/documents/ILC.pdf (last visited May 17, 2010); see, e.g., 
Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-232.2 (Supp. 2009) (repealed by Act 2007, c.1, cl.2, eff. Feb 5. 2007). 
 109. See, e.g., Treasury Blueprint, supra note 67, at 39; infra note 110.   
 110. Dep’t of Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation, available at 
www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); see also 
Stephen Labaton, Some Lawmakers Question Expanded Reach for the Fed, N.Y. Times, June 
17, 2009, at B1. 
 111. Harry Terris, Pros, Cons of Unplugging GE Capital from Its Parent, Am. Banker, Nov. 
11, 2009, at 1; see also Hopkins et al., supra note 5, at 1.   
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soundness.112  Industry observers believe that it is unlikely that the administration will achieve a 
ban on the ILC charter because it is widely recognized that the charter had nothing to do with the 
financial crisis.113  In addition, there are many powerful supporters of the ILC on both sides of 
the political spectrum who advocate for its continued existence.114  Nevertheless, the ILC has 
received national attention once again because of its unique status at the intersection of 
commerce and banking.115  Now that the dust has settled from Wal-Mart’s original application 
and the financial crisis has provided a new context to think about banking, it is time to revisit the 
ILC issue in a new light.   
 
 112. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815). 
 113. See Hopkins & Adler, supra note 5.   
 114. Senator Reid, Congressman Frank, Senator Bennett, and Senator Dodd all support the ILC 
charter and hold pivotal positions on the Senate and Congressional banking committees.  See 
Stacy Kaper, Lawmakers Doubt Key Goal of Reg Reform Plan, Am. Banker, June 19, 2009, at 
1; Joe Adler, Frank Favors Keeping Existing ILCs, Am. Banker, July 31, 2009, at 16; Emily 
Flitter & Stacy Kaper, Most Likely to Succeed: Pieces of Obama Plan, Am. Banker, June 18, 
2009, at 1.  Note, however, that Senator Bennett and Senator Dodd will not be returning to the 
Senate next year so the case against ILCs may have been weakened due to the departure of these 
advocates or the ILC issue. 
 115. See Terris, supra note 111, at 1. 
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III. THE DEBATE 
A. Value of the ILC 
Ownership of an ILC “is effectively the only vehicle by which nonfinancial firms can enter 
banking, and by which nonbank financial firms can own a depository institution without being 
subject to holding company supervision . . . .”116  Non-BHCs seeking to conduct credit or 
banking activities can do so mainly through an ILC or one of the few and limited financial firms 
that are not classified as banks.117  Many commercial firms, such as automakers, extend credit as 
part of their core business; the safest and most competitive way for these firms to fund financing 
is through a bank because they can avoid the transaction costs of dealing with outside lenders.118  
Although parent companies do not use ILCs to finance their own operations, they often use ILCs 
to offer complementary products and services to enhance the parent’s core businesses.119   
Commercial firms have established ILCs to meet various business and financing demands.120  
 
 116. Ergungor & Thomson, supra note 42, at 2. 
 117. Commercial firms can own credit card companies, nondeposit trust companies, mortgage 
companies, or commercial or consumer finance companies without being subject to the BHC 
Act.  S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 83 (2010).  There are also various thrifts and non-banks whose 
ownership was grandfathered in through CEBA and various other legislative actions.  Johnson & 
Kaufman, supra note 20, at 40. 
 118. See Lloyd, supra note 94, at 245; Ergungor & Taylor, supra note 42, at 2. 
 119. Rule 23A forbids an ILC from funding the parent company.  See infra notes 239–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 120. Ergungor & Thompson, supra note 42 at 2. 
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Indeed, the rapid growth of the industry shows that the ILC model has met a rising demand.  For 
example, the investment banking firm of Merrill Lynch, which formerly owned the largest ILC, 
Merrill Lynch Bank, USA, focused on consumer and business loans.121  Large investment banks 
and financial institutions, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and UBS, owned and 
operated many of the largest ILCs under a similar model.122  Another model for ILC ownership 
is that of commercial and retail corporations, such as GE Capital and Target.  These corporations 
use their ILCs to process financial transactions to enhance their retail operations.123  A third 
group of ILC owners, including BMW and Volkswagen, use their ILCs to directly support their 
businesses by offering direct financing for their automotive sales.124   
The rising desire for firms to enter financing and banking activities is fueled both by changes 
in the law and changes in the marketplace, including expanding credit options.125  For decades, 
banks were the primary source of credit.126   Today, companies and individuals have many 
 
 121. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 42. 
 122. Industrial Loan Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 12–13 (2007) (statement of John F. Bovenzi, Chief Operating 
Officer, FDIC) [hereinafter Bovenzi Attachment]; Steve Sloan & Joe Adler, What Future May 
Hold for Two Converts, Am. Banker, Sept. 23, 2008, at 1. 
 123. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 43. 
 124. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 18. 
 125. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 11. 
 126. Id. at 52. 
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nonbank options for obtaining credit.127   Many companies want to own an ILC because it allows 
for greater efficiency and cost-reduction in their business operations.128  There is a growing need 
for commercial firms to integrate different parts of their business as technology, and the 
changing face of banking and finance has allowed many firms to diversify their products and 
offer their customers a range of financing and credit options.129  
There have been several large exceptions to both the moratorium and the proposed 
congressional legislation, demonstrating that Congress and the FDIC seem to recognize that the 
ILC structure serves a useful function.130  As part of the automakers’ plea for a bailout before 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 52–53. 
 129. Id. at 52. 
 130. For example, in November of 2006, the FDIC set the moratorium aside for GMAC’s ILC 
so that it could approve Cerberus Capital Management’s purchase of the ILC.  Press Release, 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. FDIC Press Release No. 103-2006, FDIC Bd. Approves Change in 
Control Notice for GMAC Auto. Bank (Nov. 15, 2006) (on file with author).  In a press release, 
the FDIC stated that it needed to act on this ILC “to avoid the potential for substantial 
interference with a major restructuring by General Motors Corporation.”  Marcy Gordon, GMAC 
Bank Takeover is Approved, Deseret News, Nov. 16, 2006, at E4.  Additionally, the FDIC also 
suspended its moratorium to grant WellPoint Inc. permission to obtain FDIC insurance for its 
ILC.  Joe Adler, ILC Gets OK After Unusual Consultation, Am. Banker, Sept. 13, 2007, at 1; 
see also Peter J. Wallison, Viewpoint: Carveout Reveals ILC Bill’s True Nature, Am. Banker, 
June 29, 2007, at 11. 
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Congress on December 4, 2008, Ford Motors testified that it needed an ILC to free up necessary 
capital to finance auto loans.131  Ford intends to use its ILC as other automakers are using 
theirs—as a source of credit for its customers and dealers.132  The notion that automakers should 
be given an exception to own an ILC because of their financial weakness subverts the argument 
that the separation of banking and commerce is needed to protect the safety and soundness of the 
banking system.133   The Federal Reserve Board states that their regulation of BHCs is 
“necessary to ensure they will remain sources of strength for their subsidiary banks.”134  But 
Congress seems to now be saying that a weak parent company should be granted an exception 
because of its greater need for the charter.135  It seems that the driving force opposing the ILC 
derives less from concerns about maintaining safety and soundness in banking and more from a 
 
 131. “Having an Industrial Loan Company will place us on a more equal footing with our major 
competitors who already have such banks.  More importantly, it will benefit consumers by 
providing us another resource for reasonably priced capital, thus helping us provide credit to our 
customers and dealers,” the submission said.  Ford Motor Company, Business Plan, Submitted to 
the Senate Banking Committee, Dec. 2, 2008, at 5, 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/Brfg12308AutoPRESENTATIONOFFORDMOTORCO
MPANY122_SenateFinal_.pdf (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 132. Editorial, Ford Bets the Farm and Sells the Company Jets, Just-Auto (Dec. 2, 2008), 
http://www.just-auto.com/article.aspx?id=97032. 
 133. Wallison, supra note 130, at 11. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
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desire to exclude certain companies from the banking sector.136  
B. Arguments Against the ILC 
A broad range of groups have voiced arguments against the ILC around two themes.137  First, 
on a practical level, opponents of the ILC fear that the lack of federal consolidated supervision 
for parent companies of ILCs endangers the stability of the financial system.138  Second, and on a 
more theoretical level, opponents believe that the charter is an exception to the long history of 
 
 136. See generally id. (arguing legislation is more about protecting the banking industry from 
competitors). 
 137. The arguments are gathered from Congressional testimony during the House’s 
examination of the ILC following the FDIC moratorium as well as several other works of 
scholarship and industry reports.  The most prominent critics of the ILC in recent years have 
included Rep. Jim Leach, the GAO, the ICBA, the ABA, and Federal Reserve Vice Chairman 
Donald Kohn.  See Kohn, supra note 51, at 12–13; id. at 38–40 (testimony of James P. Ghiglieri, 
Jr. for the ICBA); id. at 40–41 (testimony of Earl D. McVicker for the ABA); GAO Report 
supra note 10, at 82–86; see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Industrial Loan 
Corporations Recent Asset Growth and Commercial Interest Highlight Differences in 
Regulatory Authority Testimony Before the Subcommittee On Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit, Committee On Financial Services, House of Representatives, at 3–4 (2006), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/071206rjh.pdf.  For recent arguments 
against ILCs, see Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1588; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Viewpoint: 
Giving GMAC Aid Would Be Big Mistake, Am. Banker, Dec. 3, 2008, at 10. 
 138. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 33. 
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separation of banking and commerce that the government has imposed in order to protect the 
safety and soundness of the banking system.139  This latter argument did not originate with the 
ILC charter or the Wal-Mart application but was rejuvenated by both.140   
Some also oppose the ILC because they claim that it is a regulatory loophole that the 
government needs to close and that the ILC exception allows commercial firms to “evade” U.S. 
banking laws.141  However, the ILC is not a product of an unintended loophole; rather, it is a 
product of several legislative measures dating from 1956 to 1999 expressly exempting ILCs from 
BHC Act restrictions.142  Regardless, the loophole argument does not address the safety of the 
 
 139. Wilmarth, note 25, at 1570–71. 
 140. The Federal Reserve and the FDIC have largely shaped the debate over the mixing of 
banking and commerce.  Two important presentations of the long debate are the 1982 essay, Are 
Banks Special?, written by Gerald Corrigan, then President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis and the 1987 bank study released by the FDIC, Mandate for Change.  E. Gerald 
Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis Ann. Rep. (1982); FDIC, 
Mandate for Change: Restructuring the Banking Industry (1987) [hereinafter FDIC, 
Mandate for Change].  
 141. ILC’s-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, H. Comm. on Financial Services 
(June 12, 2006) (testimony of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors Federal 
Reserve System) [hereinafter Alvarez Testimony]. 
 142. The BHC exempted ILCs and the exception was held and even expanded by the Garn-St. 
Germain Act (1982), CEBA (1987), and the GLB (1999).  See Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 
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ILC, which is the only appropriate reason to close an ILC “loophole,” if there is one.  As I will 
demonstrate, the arguments against the ILC have not successfully established that the charter 
poses a threat to the safety and soundness of our financial system or that ILCs are more risky or 
prone to failure than commercial banks.143  Conversely, the evidence shows that ILCs are among 
the safest banks in the country after having been tested by the recent financial crisis—a result, I 
argue, of their unique commercial partnerships.144   
1. Need for Federal Consolidated Bank Supervision 
Many opponents of the ILC argue that the charter is more prone to risk because a 
commercial parent company of an ILC is not subject to federal consolidated 
supervision.145  As Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, expressed:  
[Federal Consolidated Supervision] allows the Federal Reserve to understand the 
financial and managerial strengths and risks within the consolidated organization 
as a whole and gives the supervisor the authority and ability to identify and 
resolve significant management, operational, capital or other deficiencies within 
the overall organization before they pose a danger to the organization’s subsidiary 
 
20, at 39–41.  The GLB retained the original CEBA provisions and added a more liberal element 
to the exemption.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2006).   
 143. See infra part III.B.1. 
 144. See infra part III.B.2.e. 
 145. See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1617; Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12–13. 
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insured banks.146   
The BHC Act mandates that the FRB, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the FDIC, 
which together serve as federal consolidated supervisors, regulate any company that owns a 
bank.147  Because parent companies of ILCs are not BHCs, they are not subject to federal 
consolidated supervision.148  State regulators and the FDIC regulate ILCs; the relevant industry 
regulator, usually the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), regulates the parent 
companies.149  However, this argument rests on the assumption that a broad regulator of the 
parent company is able to detect risk better than the bottom-up approach of the FDIC.150   
If it were proven that federal consolidated supervision could reduce risks in the banking 
system, the government could easily remedy the problem by bringing commercial parents of 
ILCs under federal oversight.151  The White Papers suggest a greater regulatory reach over 
 
 146. See Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 132. 
 147. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1843 (2006). 
 148. See Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12–13. 
 149. See West, supra note 9, at 6 n.8.  Ed Leary explains, “While not subject to regulation as 
bank holding companies, industrial bank owners are subject to many of the same requirements as 
bank holding companies.  As a result, safeguards already exist to protect these depository 
institutions against abuses by the companies that control them or activities of affiliates that might 
jeopardize the safety and soundness of the institutions or endanger the deposit insurance system.”  
Leary Testimony, supra note 19, at 165. 
 150. See Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12–13. 
 151. A common regulator with plenary oversight responsibility over the many players in our 
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companies that are financially relevant but not over BHCs.152  The commercial parents of ILCs 
are already highly regulated entities that could be subjected to further oversight without having 
to change their core business to control a bank, as the BHC Act requires.153  However, the critics 
have not shown evidence suggesting that the Federal Reserve’s approach is any more effective 
than the approach of the FDIC and the state regulators.  In fact, the Federal Reserve has recently 
come under intense criticism, and virtually every comprehensive banking reform proposal 
addresses the fundamental weaknesses of the Federal Reserve’s monitoring system and proposes 
 
financial system could ensure the safety of our system by regulating all affiliate relationships 
between the various commercial, financial, and banking players.  In 2008, the Treasury stated: 
“A single prudential regulator focusing on safety and soundness of firms with federal guarantees, 
similar to the OCC, but with appropriate authority to deal with affiliate relationship issues.  
Prudential regulation in this context would be applied to individual firms, and it would operate 
like the current regulation of insured depository institutions, with capital adequacy requirements, 
investment limits, activity limits, and direct on-site risk management supervision.  The prudential 
regulator would oversee firms with explicit government guarantees.”  Treasury Blueprint, 
supra note 67, at 18. 
 152. The White House proposal states that companies that are Tier 1 FHCs, defined as 
systemically important financial firms, would be regulated by the Federal Reserve.  Strictly 
commercial firms would not qualify as Tier 1 FHCs.  See Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 110, at 
10. 
 153. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 52. 
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changes to that structure.154   
The FDIC has both the authority and the capacity to effectively regulate ILCs and their 
parents.155  The FDIC and the state regulators of ILCs have proven to be capable regulators and 
have formed and followed a rigorous system for evaluating and managing risks.156  ILCs that are 
owned by commercial firms have rarely caused significant supervisory problems, and their 
record of safe and sound practices compares favorably with other depository institutions.157  It 
has not been shown that the types of risk that threaten banks have more to do with the identity of 
the regulator or the owner as opposed to the management of the individual institution.158   
 
 154. See Labaton, supra note 110.   
 155. See Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 7–8; Jones statement, supra note 14, at 10–13. 
 156. Jones Statement, supra note 14, at 19–20. 
 157. See generally, Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III & Robert C. Eager, The Separation of Banking 
and Commerce Revisited, in The Mixing of Banking & Commerce 39 (2007).  “‘As Chairman 
Bair stated at the 2007 House Hearing: ‘FDIC supervisory policies regarding any depository 
institution, including an ILC, are concerned with organizational relationships, particularly 
compliance with the rules and regulations intended to prevent potentially abusive practices. . . .  
The FDIC’s overall examination experience with ILCs has been similar to the larger population 
of insured institutions, and the causes and patterns displayed by problem ILCs have been like 
those of other institutions.’ She noted no instance of FDIC enforcement due to abusive 
practices.”  Id. at 59 n.59. 
 158. Press Release, Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC, The ILC Debate: Regulatory and 
Supervisory Issues, Remarks Before the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May 30, 2003) 
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The FDIC manages every stage of ILC conversion, including evaluating all entry applications 
and sometimes requiring a change of structure as a precondition to acceptance.159  The FDIC has 
the same supervisory powers over the parent companies of ILCs that it has over the parent and 
affiliates of any other bank; that is, the FDIC’s oversight and enforcement power extends to the 
parent or affiliates of any bank whose activities affect that bank.160  The FDIC has statutory 
authority to examine and take action against any ILC affiliate in order to protect it from risky 
actions by affiliates,161 including issuing a cease-and-desist order.162  In fact, the FDIC has used 
 
[hereinafter Powell Remarks].  Donald Powell, reflecting on two decades of FDIC experience, 
states: “It is important to note here that risk posed by any depository institution depends on the 
appropriateness of the institution’s business plan and model, management’s competency to run 
the bank, the quality of the institution’s risk-management processes, and, of course, the 
institution’s level of capital. . . . Further, the firewalls and systems of governance safeguarding 
ILCs from misuse by their parent companies are, in many cases, more stringent than what exists 
in many affiliates of bank holding companies.  In part, the generally positive experience of the 
ILC charter in recent years is attributable to a continually evolving supervisory approach that 
considers each institution’s purpose and placement within the organizational structure.”  Id. 
 159. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2006) (expanding the FDIC’s incidental powers). 
 160. Id. § 1820(b)(2).  For a comprehensive view of FDIC supervisory power and authority, see 
West, supra note 9, at 5–13.   
 161. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b); see also id. § 1820(b)(4)(A)  
 162. In addition to cease and desist powers, the FDIC can impose civil money penalties, 
involuntary termination of insurance, or divestiture.  12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), (c), (d), (e), (i). 
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this power on several occasions to reach outside a bank in order to manage risk.  Most notably, 
the FDIC recently issued a cease-and-desist order to an ILC’s corporate parent for problems 
relating to the underwriting of subprime mortgages.163   
Similarly, the State of Utah, which is the primary state regulator for most of the nation’s ILCs, 
has developed a sophisticated monitoring system and has plenary control over both ILCs and 
their parent companies.164  Utah’s application process is very similar to that of the FDIC and 
examines the parent’s reputation and financial standing as well as several other factors before 
approving an ILC charter.165  Utah can examine an ILC and take any enforcement or remedial 
action necessary against a bank and any affiliate.166  The state can force a change of 
management, issue cease-and-desist orders, force mergers or acquisitions, and even take 
possession of the institution.167  In addition, the Commissioner has the direct authority to take an 
enforcement action against the holding company or any affiliate.168   
Some industry observers argue that Utah and FDIC oversight is more effective than federal 
consolidated supervision because it targets the safety of the bank and is not divided between 
 
 163. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Issues Cease and Desist Order Against Fremont Investment 
and Loan, Brea California, and Its Parents (Mar. 7, 2007). 
 164. See generally Leary Remarks, supra note 53. 
 165. See What is a Utah Industrial Bank?, Utah Department of Financial Institutions, 
http://www.dfi.utah.gov/whatisIB.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) 
 166. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-313 (Lexis Nexis 2009). 
 167. Id. §§ 7-1-307, 7-1-308, 7-2-1(3). 
 168. Id. §§ 7-1-307, 308, 313, 314, 501, 7-2-1.   
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different regulators.169  Various regulators oversee traditional BHCs and their banks, and the 
process of communication is not always smooth.170  Furthermore, Utah also participates in the 
FDIC’s Large Bank Supervision Program (LIDI Program), which places a state regulator on-site 
at an ILC of a large or complex company at all times to ensure the safety and soundness of the 
ILC.171   
The argument that ILC ownership by commercial firms should not be allowed because of the 
lack of federal consolidated supervision is not persuasive because it has not been proven that 
bank-centered supervision is less able to detect risk than top-down supervision or supervision of 
the parent.  Bill Seidman, the former FDIC chairman, argued twenty years ago that the best way 
to achieve a flexible and sound financial system was to take a “bank-centric approach.”172  
Seidman’s advice “was to ensure that regulators be given sufficient powers to regulate the 
 
 169. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 51–52. 
 170. Id. at 203–04. 
 171. Utah Commissioner Leary notes, “Utah is participating with the FDIC in the Large Bank 
Supervision Program for [several] industrial bank[s.] . . . .  The supervision of these large banks 
is coordinated by a full-time relationship manger [sic] for the State as well as the FDIC.”  Leary 
Remarks, supra note 53, at 4.  These examiners coordinate the implementation of the supervisory 
plan for each bank.  This plan generally involves three targeted reviews that roll-up to an annual 
Examination Report that is reviewed with management and the board.  See id.  
 172. Sheila Bair, The Fourth Wave—The Mixing of Banking & Commerce, in The Mixing of 
Banking & Commerce, supra note 157, at 9, 11. 
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relationship between banking and commerce rather than not allow it.”173   
Notwithstanding, it is uncertain whether the structure or scope of a banking regulator can 
ensure safety in a banking system.  A study conducted in 2002 analyzed bank performance and 
supervision in fifty-five countries and found “little support at best to the belief that any particular 
bank supervisory structure will greatly affect bank performance.”174  Nevertheless, policymakers 
are currently engaged in the process of reforming and restructuring U.S. banking regulators in 
order to more effectively protect the banking sector and the economy from the failures that 
caused the recent credit crisis that crippled the nation’s banks.175  As they do so, they will need to 
reexamine some of the previously accepted principles of banking, such as which regulatory 
structure ensures safety and soundness.  While that question is beyond the scope of this Article, 
the ILC supervisory structure is an example of the success of bottom-up supervision.   
2. Traditional Separation of Commerce and Banking 
The main argument waged against the ILC is that commercial ownership of the ILC goes 
against the traditional U.S. policy of separation of commerce and banking.176  The separation of 
 
 173. Id. at 11. 
 174. James R. Barth et al., A Cross-Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and 
Bank Performance, 12 Fin. Markets, Institutions & Instruments 67, 67 (2003). 
 175. See, e.g., Treasury Blueprint, supra note 67, at 1. 
 176. Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1539; see also Paul Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, U.S. Senate (Jan. 21, 1987), in 73 Fed. Res. Bull., Mar. 1987, at 199; Alan Greenspan, 
H.R. 10, The Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997, Testimony Before the Committee 
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banking and commerce, however, is not a long-standing “tradition” but a restriction imposed 
through a few acts of legislation.  The first legislative separation of banking and commerce 
occurred in the aftermath of the Great Depression, and the restriction against commercial firm 
ownership of banks, the main focus of this Article, did not begin until 1970.177  “Until 1956, any 
corporation could own any number of commercial banks”;178 and until the passage of the second 
amendment of the BHC Act in 1970, any nonbank entity could own one commercial bank.179  
 
on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (May 22, 1997); James 
Ghiglieri Jr., President of Alpha Comty. Bank & Chairman of Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., 
Indus. Loan Cos., Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial 
Services 2 (April 25, 2007), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/pdf/Ghiglieri.pdf 
[hereinafter ICBA Testimony] (“The ILC charter continues to threaten our nation’s historic 
separation of banking and commerce and undermine our system of holding company 
supervision, harming consumers and threatening financial stability.”); Kohn Testimony, supra 
note 51, at 1 (“If left unchecked, this recent and potential growth of firms operating under the 
[ILC] exception threatens to undermine the decisions that Congress has made concerning the 
separation of banking and commerce in the American [society].”). 
 177. Muckenfuss & Eager, supra note 157; see generally Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 
144.   
 178. Huertas, supra note 1, at 744.   
 179. Id.  In 1970, the BHC Act defined the term “bank” for its purposes to be an institution that 
makes commercial loans and accepts deposits payable on demand; any other corporation could 
own commercial banks that fulfilled one condition but not the other.  Carl Felsenfeld, Non-Bank 
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Though the wisdom of mixing banking and commerce is the subject of intense debate, many 
scholars have dispelled the notion that the separation of commerce and banking is a long-
standing principle guiding U.S. banking history.180  In fact, a 1987 FDIC study argues that there 
has never been a complete separation of commerce and banking in America.181   
At their inception, banks and commercial firms were difficult to distinguish and were all 
“merchant banks.”182  Most private banks were established only to support commercial trading 
activity, and many banks, such as Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan, were directly involved in 
commercial ventures.183  Some state charters even allowed banks to maintain an ownership 
position in other companies or to directly combine with them.184  “[A] prominent example of the 
mixing of banking and commerce is the chartering of the Manhattan Company.  In 1799, New 
York State granted a corporate charter to Aaron Burr for the establishment of a company to 
 
Banks: An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus. L. 99, 109–11, 113 (1985). 
 180. See Huertas, supra note 1, at 755; Joseph G. Haubrich & Joao A.C. Santos, Banking and 
Commerce: A Liquidity Approach (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 78, 1999); see 
also FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 98; Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 
121.  
 181. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 98.  The study also argues that 
restriction on bank activities and affiliations, such as the Glass-Steagall Act and the BHC Act, 
should be abolished.  Id. at 99–100. 
 182. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 128. 
 183. Id. at 127–28. 
 184. Id.  
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provide New York City with a safe water supply.”185  In addition to the water works, the charter 
also allowed Burr to establish a bank to finance the water works.  “The Bank of the Manhattan 
Company was formed and became the largest bank in the city as well as the state, and survives 
today as Chase Manhattan Bank.”186  The Manhattan Company continued to sell water and 
engage in banking throughout most of the nineteenth century.187   
In addition, many individuals held, and still hold, controlling shares in both banks and 
commercial firms.188  In the nineteenth century, the banker-industrialists Thomas Mellon and 
Moses Taylor each owned controlling interests in banks and a variety of commercial 
enterprises.189  In fact, Sam Walton of Wal-Mart was the chief executive and principal 
 
 185. FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 24.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. “In the nineteen [sic] century, for example, Moses Taylor owned controlling interests in 
the National City Bank (a forerunner of Citibank) . . . [as well as] a mercantile house, a gas 
utility and an iron company.  Thomas Mellon started a private bank in Pittsburgh in the mid-
nineteenth century and by the turn of the century the Mellon family owned controlling interests 
in Mellon National Bank, Gulf Oil, Alcoa Aluminum and various other industrial enterprises.” 
Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 155.  For additional examples of investors that have had 
controlling interests in both banks and commercial firms simultaneously, see Huertas, supra note 
1, at 744. 
 189. Huertas, supra note 1, at 744.  For other examples, see Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 
155. 
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shareholder of Northwest Arkansas Bancshares, a BHC.190  Directors on the boards of major U.S. 
banks are often affiliated with a broad range of corporations.191   
The Glass-Steagall Act (GSA), 192 which formally initiated a legal separation between banking 
and commerce in the United States, was a response to the Great Depression and the perception 
that banks with ties to corporations were too powerful and that these relationships led to the 
crash.193  Many scholars have challenged this assertion.194  Studies have shown that most of the 
 
 190. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 19; see also Haubrich & Santos, 
supra note 3, at 155–56. 
 191. See Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 131, 155–56. 
 192. The Glass-Steagall Act (named after its congressional sponsors, Senator Carter Glass and 
Congressman Henry Steagall) is found in the Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1988)).   
 193. See Janet A. Broeckel, Regulation of Bank Holding Companies’ State Bank Subsidiaries 
That Engage in Nonbanking Activities: An Unjustified Extension of the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Regulatory Power, 4 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 169, 171–73 (1990).  The GSA was enacted because 
of concerns about the risky behavior of commercial banks, such as “buying, selling, and 
underwriting questionably sound securities.”  Id. at 173 n.23; see also Haubrich & Santos, supra 
note 3, at 133. 
 194. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at ix (“It was demonstrated long ago, 
and in a convincing fashion, that the Great Depression in no way resulted from the common 
ownership of commercial and investment banking firms.  The Glass-Steagall Act was largely the 
result of efforts by Senator Carter Glass, who was guided in his efforts by his belief in the 
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abuses that arose during the 1920s appear to have reflected conflicts of interest pertaining to 
dealings with outside parties rather than transactions with banks and their affiliates, which is the 
aim of the GSA.195  Increased oversight of the financial sector could have addressed the 
problems that led to the Great Depression without resorting to comprehensive activity 
restrictions.  The FDIC observed:  
Until the 1930s, the securities affiliates of banks were not regulated, examined, or 
in any way restricted in the activities in which they could participate.  Not 
surprisingly, abuses occurred.  A certain degree of supervision and regulation and 
some restrictions on affiliate powers would have contributed significantly toward 
eliminating the types of abuses that occurred during this period.196  
The GSA, which was enthusiastically accepted by Congress as the nation was reeling from the 
Great Depression, was based on fears of what could happen rather than a direct response to what 
 
discredited ‘real-bills’ doctrine.”)  For an explanation of the Real-Bills doctrine, see FDIC, 
Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 44 (“Scholars have studied the record with great care 
since 1933.  There is little or no evidence that the investment banking activities of commercial 
bank affiliates were a major cause of bank failures.  To the extent that securities investments 
were a factor in bank failures, it was because of liquidity problems rather than credit-quality 
concerns.  It is hard to imagine banks not having liquidity problems in the face of massive bank 
runs and no backup liquidity support, regardless of the types of earning assets in their 
portfolios.”).   
 195. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 44. 
 196. Id. at ix.   
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actually did happen.  Nevertheless, the Act’s passage marks the beginning of a formal separation 
between banking and commerce in the United States.197  The target of the GSA is the activities 
that can be conducted within a bank.198  The Act does not allow banks to engage in commercial 
activities.199  This separation still guides our banking laws today even though our system of 
banking would be practically unrecognizable to the regulators of the 1930s.200  The GSA, 
however, did half the job of separating banking and commerce because it only applied to banks, 
but not to holding companies.201  That did not change until the 1950s.202   
Congress extended the separation of banking and commerce initiated by the passage of the 
GSA to restrictions on the activities of owners of banks through the 1956 BHC Act and its 1966 
and 1970 Amendments.203  By most accounts, the BHC Act was aimed at the expansion of one 
corporation, Transamerica, and its principal aim was to prevent conglomeration in banking.204  
 
 197. Broeckel, supra note 193, at 172. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. at 172 n.22.   
 200. Banks used to serve as the only source of credit.  In our current securitized market, there 
are many sources for financing and banks compete with other credit markets such as the capital 
markets and commercial paper.  See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 6–7.   
 201. Broeckel, supra note 193, at 173. 
 202. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 140. 
 203. See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 
Va. L. Rev. 301, 319 (1987).   
 204. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 36–50.  “[I]n 1948 . . . [t]he Federal 
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Transamerica Corporation was formed in 1930 and was structured as a holding company that 
owned many types of businesses, including banks, real estate, insurers, mortgagees, and even 
commercial fishing companies.205  Transamerica wanted to create a nationwide bank, but the 
BHC Act, which prohibits any company that controls a bank from engaging in any non-banking 
or commercial activities, prevented this action.206  The BHC Act initiated and completed the 
restrictions on ownership of banks by commercial firms.  Scholars often cite the need to control 
expansion as the primary cause of the BHC Act.207  Supporters of the BHC Act point out the 
potential for abuse when the same owner controls both banking and commercial firms; however, 
 
Reserve Board charged that Transamerica was in violation of the Clayton Antitrust Act by 
monopolizing commercial banking in [several states].  Id. at 31.  “At that time, Transamerica 
controlled 46 banks, in addition to owning a large percentage of Bank of America.”  Id.  “In 
1952, the Board ordered Transamerica to divest itself of all its bank stock, except for Bank of 
America, within two years.”  Id.  A Court of Appeals “[set] aside the Board’s decision in 1953 
[and decided that] [u]nder the Clayton Act . . . ‘the Board failed to demonstrate that 
Transamerica’s acquisitions substantially lessened competition among the acquired banks.’”  Id. 
 205. J. Nellie Liang & Donald T. Savage, The Nonbank Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 
76 Fed. Reg. Bull. 280, 280 n.1, 281 (1990). 
 206. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, §§ 2–11, 70 Stat. 133-46 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988)).  The Act also forces BHCs to divest of all interests in 
companies that are not considered banks under the BHC Act.  Id. at §1843(a)(2). 
 207. See Liang & Savage, supra note 205, at 280; Fischel et al., supra note 203. 
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when BHCs were unregulated, there was little evidence of such abuse.208  The real concern 
seemed to be that BHCs were seen as a threat to the existence of small unit banks.209   
Congress viewed the separation of banking and commerce through the BHC Act as a way to 
prevent the concentration of power.210  When Congress first passed the BHC Act, it exempted 
companies that held only one bank from the activity restrictions placed on companies that owned 
two or more banks.211  Congress felt that the threat was contained in large multibank 
conglomerates and that, because most one-bank holding companies were small, they did not pose 
a problem.212  However, in the three years after the passage of the 1966 Amendment, one-bank 
holding companies grew substantially and became the holders of some of the nation’s largest 
banks.213  Consequently, Congress amended the BHC Act in 1970 to bring one-bank holding 
companies under its supervision and, thus, initiated a complete restriction on commercial 
 
 208. See Fischel et al., supra note 203, at 320; see FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 
140, at 31. 
 209. For an explanation of the origins of the BHCA, see Liang & Savage, supra note 205, at 
280–81.  See also Fischel et al., supra note 203, at 331. 
 210. Liang & Savage, supra note 205, at 280–81.   
 211. Id. at 281. 
 212. FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 32; see also, S. Rep. No. 84–1095, at 1 
(1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2482 (“[P]ublic welfare requires the enactment of 
legislation providing Federal regulation of the growth of bank holding companies and the type of 
assets it is appropriate for such companies to control.”).  
 213. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 144. 
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ownership of banks for the first time in U.S. history.214  In explaining the passage of the 1970 
Amendment, Congress conceded: 
 In making this decision, the committee wishes to note its agreement with all of 
the Government regulatory agencies who testified that there have been no major 
abuses effectuated through the one-bank holding company device.  It is clearly 
understood that the legislation is to prevent possible future problems rather than to 
solve existing ones.215 
U.S. firms have attempted to circumvent the BHC Act’s restrictions since its imposition.216  
Banks have tried to expand the definition of what business activities the BHC Act considers 
related to banking and, thus, permissible.217  Each time, however, the legislature responded by 
narrowing the definition of what activities are considered “incidental” to banking 218 and finally 
issued a specific list of permissible bank activities.219  Commercial firms bypassed the limitations 
 
 214. See Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 39.  
 215. S. Rep. No. 91-1084 at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5522. 
 216. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 143. 
 217. Id. at 150. 
 218. The Garn-St. Germain Act narrowed the scope of what is considered banking.  Lloyd, 
supra note 94, at 213 (citing Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)). 
 219. For a comprehensive overview of U.S. banking law and the list of non-banking activities 
allowed by the Board, see A.M. Pollard et al., Banking Law in the United States 272–88 (2d 
ed. 1988).   
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of the BHC Act by establishing nonbank type entities that had one element of the banking 
definition but not the other.220  Thus, companies were essentially using nonbank banks as a 
means of merging commerce and banking to meet the demands of their complex business 
operations.221  Congress will either need to recognize these loopholes or loosen the BHC Act’s 
restrictions on banking activities. 
Supporters of the BHC Act and the restrictions on commercial firm ownership of banks claim 
that the separation ensures the overall safety of banking.  First, there are concerns that when 
banks and commercial firms affiliate, conflicts of interest will occur.222  Second, proponents 
argue that unfair competition will result from the mixture.223  Third, there are fears that financial 
 
 220. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 147–49.  “By late 1986, there had been applications 
for about 400 charters for nonbank banks submitted to the Comptroller of the Currency.”  Id. at 
147. 
 221. Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the 
time, testified before the Senate Banking Committee: “Essentially, the nonbank bank has become 
a device for tearing down the separation of commerce and banking by permitting a commercial 
firm to enter the traditional banking business without abiding by the provisions of the Bank 
Holding Company Act.”  Volcker, supra note 176, at 200. 
 222. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 72; see also ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at 39; Kohn 
Testimony, supra note 51, at 24; Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1549–50. 
 223. See Featherstone, supra note 90 (posing the question as to whether Wal-Mart would lend 
money to its direct competitors and the potential effects on the proposed bank if Wal-Mart goes 
bust); see also Raskovich, supra note 44, at 3. 
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and economic monopolies or conglomerates will be created that would foreclose competition.224  
Fourth, some individuals are concerned with the extension of the federal safety net to a 
commercial entity that a banking authority does not supervise.225  Fifth, there is concern that the 
systemic risk increases when banking and commerce are mixed.226  In the following section, I 
will explore each of these arguments in more depth.   
a. Conflicts of Interest 
Critics of the ILC state that the mixing of banking and commerce would “add to the potential 
for increased conflicts of interest and raise the risk that insured institutions may engage in 
anticompetitive or unsound practices.”227  Another fear is that banks affiliated with commercial 
firms may lend to their affiliates at much more preferable rates than other entities.228  There is 
certainly potential for conflicts and abuse in many commercial and financial relationships.   
Conflicts of interest already exist in commercial banks, among the different types of activities 
 
 224. See generally Jones Statement, supra note 14; Terry J. Jorde, President and CEO of 
CountryBank USA, FDIC Symposium, The Future of Banking: The Structure and Role of 
Commercial Affiliations (July 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/future_jordespeech.html. 
 225. Jorde, supra note 224. 
 226. See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1543. 
 227. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 72; see also ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at 39–40; 
Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12–13; Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1549–50. 
 228. Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 128. 
156 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63 
conducted by securities firms, and many other industries.229  Conflicts of interest also abound in 
many types of commercial and financial enterprises.  For example, there is a conflict of interest 
within many banks due to a security firm’s role as an “impartial” investment advisor and its role 
as a promoter of investment products.  Automobile dealers with service departments are in a 
position to misrepresent to their customers the condition of their cars in order to perform 
unnecessary repairs or sell new cars.  Real estate brokers face a conflict between their own 
interests to sell a property versus the seller’s interest in securing the largest purchase price.  
However, banks and commercial firms can plausibly create internal separation between their 
commercial and banking activities.230  In all of these enterprises, increasing disclosure and 
punishment for false or misleading statements could eliminate a conflict.  Accordingly, 
regulators should eliminate informational asymmetries and increase oversight, supervision, and 
penalties for breach before an activity or affiliation is prohibited.  These restrictions on 
ownership of banks came before any abuse or failed attempt at regulation instead of being 
 
 229. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 138 (discussing conflicts of interest of bank directors 
with trust clients). 
 230. Note that Michael Lewis contends in “The Big Short” that these so-called “Chinese Walls” 
that were supposed to function as barriers between different departments in large investment 
banks were not effective in the least.  Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday 
Machine 204–05 (2010).  However, it seems that the situations that led to the breaking of these 
“barriers” were ripe for abuse and unlike the relationship between a commercial parent and its 
banking subsidiary. 
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imposed after abuses occurred and regulation was proven to be inadequate.231  Before activity 
restriction, it needs to be demonstrated that existing controls are insufficient to prevent these 
types of conflicts of interest abuse in ILCs.232  In the limited world of ILCs, there is evidence that 
such abuses have not occurred.  Affiliations between commercial firms and banks have not 
resulted in any failures due to conflicts of interest or self-dealing of any kind in the time that 
 
 231. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 44 (noting that Congress made no 
attempt in the 1930s to test the effect of regulation and supervision before mandating an outright 
prohibition). 
 232. Donald Powell’s remarks before Congress note the effectiveness of FDIC supervisory 
practices and also note that the FDIC has “found parent companies of ILCs to be acutely 
conscious of their responsibilities with respect to their ILC subsidiaries and the consequences of 
violating applicable laws and regulations.”  Powell Remarks, supra note 158.  After an extensive 
study in the 1980s of the potential for conflict, the FDIC concluded: “Despite the widespread 
potential for abuse, there is little to suggest that conflict-of-interest abuse in the U.S. economy is 
at an unacceptable level.  Those who make such claims bear the burden of proof, but they have 
presented no such proof . . . . Without evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that existing 
controls are adequate to prevent excessive conflict-of interest abuse.  Nowhere is this more true 
than in the banking industry.”  See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 46; see also 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Modernizing the Fin. System: Recommendations for Safer, More 
Competitive Banks 29–36, 46–48 (1991); Muckenfuss & Eager, supra note 157, at 57 n.36 
(citing Rose Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory System: Restructuring 
Federal Bank Regulation, 17 FDIC Banking Rev. 4, 13–15 (2005)). 
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ILCs have been owned by commercial parents.233 
However, there is still a risk of potential abuse, and the risk of abuse arising from a conflict of 
interest is greatest when an affiliate is in danger of failing.  For instance, when an affiliate needs 
substantial aid, an affiliate could force a bank to offer aid at the expense of its own solvency.  
The argument follows that an ILC would come to the aid of its commercial affiliates, or vice-
versa, and each firm would risk its own safety to protect its affiliate, resulting in a conflict of 
interest.  However, history does not support this fear.  In the 1970s when rising interest rates 
threatened many bank-sponsored Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), the banks that 
sponsored them came to their aid in many cases.234  Regulators could have tried to discourage 
such activity, but in fact, the Federal Reserve supported and encouraged efforts by banks to save 
their REITs.235  It is noteworthy, however, that not a single bank failed as a result of aid given to 
REITs.236  Although there may be some incentives for banks to aid associated or affiliated firms, 
“there is no evidence from the REIT experience that the incentive is so great that a bank is 
willing to go down with the ship.”237  Several ILC owners have also experienced bankruptcy 
 
 233. See infra notes 363–67 and accompanying text. 
 234. FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 78. 
 235. Id. at 117 (citing Anthony Cornyn et al., An Analysis of the Concept of Corporate 
Separateness in BHC Regulation From an Economic Perspective, in Proceedings of a 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 1986). 
 236. Id.  
 237. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 118.  This article also analyzes seven 
different situations where a safe wall was erected between an ailing bank and its bank holding 
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without resorting to taking funds from their ILCs.238   
The fear that banks would make favorable loans to their affiliates also ignores the fact that 
preferential lending is illegal and that violators face severe penalties.  This type of conflict is 
certainly a source of concern and could endanger a bank, but it is the exact conduct addressed by 
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, which limit transactions between a bank and 
its affiliates.239  Similarly, section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act requires that any transaction 
between a bank and its affiliates needs to be “on terms and conditions, including credit standards, 
that are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to [the bank] as those prevailing at the 
time for comparable transactions” with unaffiliated companies.”240   
 
company and the failure did not cause any loss to the FDIC insurance fund or danger to the bank.  
Id. at 118–24.  The FDIC concludes that “effective insulation is possible . . . . Subsidiaries and 
affiliates can be protected against legal risks if certain procedures are followed to ensure that the 
operations are conducted in truly separate corporate entities . . . . [N]ew powers can be granted to 
banking organizations, with appropriate safeguards to ensure that the banking system remains 
safe and sound.”  Id. at 127. 
 238. See infra Part III.B.2.e and accompanying footnotes.  
 239. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2008).  There are also strict collateral requirements on any 
transactions between an ILC and its parent.  See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(E) (2008); see also § 
371c(a)(1)(A)–(B) (stating that covered transactions with a single affiliate may not exceed 10% 
of the bank’s capital and surplus and such transactions with all affiliates may not exceed 20% of 
the bank’s capital and surplus).   
 240. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982), amended by Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, 12 
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Despite these safeguards, abuses may occur, and regulators must vigilantly supervise banks to 
deter these types of offenses.241  Fraud and abuse can occur despite the most comprehensive 
regulatory safeguards and oversight.  With mixed results, Congress and the banking agencies 
have attempted to develop a strong and effective regime for protecting insured banks from abuse 
by insiders or affiliates.242  There is certainly room for improvement in banking regulation in 
general.  However, when there are laws designed to prevent abuse from conflicts of interest and 
 
U.S.C.A. § 371c-1 (1987).   
 241. Camden R. Fine, U.S. Households & The Mixing of Banking & Commerce, in The 
Mixing of Banking & Commerce, supra note 157, at 28, 31.  Camden Fine expresses doubt 
about the effectiveness of firewalls: “In my view, regulatory ‘firewalls’ are like the French 
Maginot line, they are a monument to the folly of man.  There is always a Rommel (or in our 
present context Keating, Lay, or Ebbers) that will devise a way around.”; see also ILCs—A 
Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. 
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 43 (2006) 
(statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (“A lot of things have been 
dealt with by statute but, you know, you heard about the statute of limitations.  I’m going to give 
you a new concept—a limitation of statutes.  Just because it’s in the statutes doesn’t mean that 
it’s going to happen.”); Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1596 (stating that firewalls break down in 
times of financial stress).   
 242. See Muckenfuss & Eager, supra note 157, at 47 (challenging the “assumption that 
commercial firms manage their business with less care for legal compliance and sound 
management principles than BHCs”). 
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there are regulators responsible for enforcing these laws, prohibiting commercial firms from 
owning banks because of the potential for a conflict of interest undermines regulators’ abilities to 
control abuse.   
As a 2005 FDIC study examining potential conflicts of interest concludes:  
On examination, the principal potential conflicts that are offered as a rationale for 
separating banking and commerce seem unlikely to pose significant risks to the 
safety and soundness of the bank or to the federal safety net . . . . [M]ost conflict 
situations affecting banks can be controlled through the supervisory process and 
enforcement of the appropriate firewalls and need not pose excessive risk to banks 
or the banking system.243  
b. Unfair Competition 
Opponents of the ILC assert that 
[t]he ILC exception fosters an unfair and unlevel competitive and regulatory 
playing field by allowing firms that acquire an insured ILC in a handful of states 
to operate outside the activity restrictions and consolidated supervisory and 
regulatory framework that apply to other community-based, regional and 
diversified organizations that own a . . . bank.244 
Community banks, fearing that Wal-Mart will have an adverse effect on community banking, 
 
 243. Christine E. Blair, The Future of Banking in America, The Mixing of Banking and 
Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16 FDIC Banking Rev. No. 4, 97, 104 (2004). 
 244. Scott Alvarez, General Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd., Testimony Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Oct. 4, 2007). 
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are the most vocal group opposing the ILC.245  The Independent Community Bankers of America 
(ICBA) testified that some commercial firms that have applied for an ILC “have the size and 
resources to engage in predatory pricing for as long as it takes to drive the local competitors out 
of the market.”246  They claim that Wal-Mart will use its size and market dominance to undercut 
prices and drive community banks out of business.247  For several decades, community bankers 
have directed this fear of “bigness” towards banking organizations due to the “special” nature of 
banks and their centrality to the country’s financial system.248  This fear was especially prevalent 
in the years immediately following World War II possibly because the popular feeling at that 
time was that close ties between banking and industry in the Axis Powers facilitated the events 
that led to the war.249   
It is important to distinguish between unfair and fair competition—the latter being good for 
the market and the former damaging.250  In a paper written for the Department of Justice 
 
 245. See ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at 38–40; see also Letter from Greenville 
Community Bank to John F. Carter, Reg’l Dir. of FDIC (Sept. 20, 2005); Letter from Mark 
Nowak, Senior Lender, Farmers State Bank, to John F. Carter, Reg’l Dir. of FDIC (Sept. 19, 
2005). 
 246. ICBA Testimony, supra note 150, at 39 n.40.   
 247. Id.   
 248. See generally Corrigan, supra note 140.   
 249. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 1–14.   
 250. Considering Wal-Mart’s past practices, a Wal-Mart national bank could certainly have a 
damaging effect on small banks across the U.S.  However, if regulators decided to limit Wal-
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Economic Analysis Group, Alexander Raskovich analyzed the Herfindahl–Hirshmann Index, a 
common measure of market concentration, to determine whether the mixing of banking and 
commerce would lead to any market foreclosure or monopoly concerns.251  The study concludes 
that “so long as commercial rivals have good alternative sources of credit, concerns with 
‘competitive inequality’ in lending are misplaced.”252  Raskovich states that even in a rural 
banking situation where banks are more concentrated, vertical integration, or the affiliation of a 
bank and a commercial firm, is unlikely to lead to attempts to foreclose rivals.253  He also notes 
that banks are no more vulnerable to market foreclosure than many other industries stating, “[i]n 
comparison with many other industries, banking appears neither exceptionally concentrated nor 
unusually susceptible to foreclosure risks.”254 
In addition, the changes in the U.S. banking system over the last decade weaken these anti-
competitive fears.  U.S. banking has seen incredible growth and expansion due to the 1994 
Reigle–Neal Interstate Branching Statute, which has expanded the ability of banks to expand 
across state lines, making national banking much easier and allowing banks to “shop” for 
 
Mart’s expansion into national banking, they could do so without disrupting a successful and 
safe industry and without using Wal-Mart as a stand-in for the larger debate about the mixing of 
banking and commerce.   
 251. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 4. 
 252. Id. at 3. 
 253. Id. at 5. 
 254. Id. at 6. 
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competitive state regulations and rates.255  Moreover, internet and communications advances 
have made fundamental changes to the banking industry and allowed for many additional 
banking players to enter the finance and credit market, formerly dominated by traditional 
banks.256  These changes have reduced barriers to entry for many small banks and have allowed 
for banks to compete for customers through the internet.  ILCs would only increase healthy 
competition in the banking sector by allowing new entrants to enter banking.  Although advances 
have allowed increased competition, the banking sector is becoming increasingly dominated by a 
small number of large and powerful banks that have been backed by funds from the federal 
government.257  Small- and mid-sized banks have become more vulnerable because they are not 
“too big to fail.”258  Experts predict that this conglomeration will continue and accelerate as the 
banking crisis continues and small banks can no longer survive.259  The funding structure of ILCs 
provides a way for small- and medium-sized banks to survive with backing from a commercial 
parent rather than from the federal government.   
 
 255. Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(1)) (permitting BHCs to acquire 
control of out-of-state banks regardless of state law prohibitions and allowing interstate 
branching by foreign and domestic BHCs).   
 256. Huertas, infra note 382, at 62. 
 257. See Arthur Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and 
the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 963, 963–1050 (2009). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
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As noted, fears of unfair competition most likely center on the threat of a hypothetical “Wal-
Mart national bank.”260  In fact, Wal-Mart has already entered into some forms of banking 
without any major consequences to its banking competitors.261  Wal-Mart has been marketing the 
debit card for the past few years and has also been offering money transfer services, check 
cashing services, and money orders at significantly lower prices than its competitors.262  Wal-
Mart stores process about one million financial transactions a week.263  There is no indication 
that Wal-Mart is pricing Western Union or its other competitors out of business.  
Wal-Mart has a potential banking customer base different than traditional retail banks.  
Analysts have estimated that about one-fifth of Wal-Mart customers do not have bank accounts, 
a ratio twice the national rate.264  Consequently, Wal-Mart could have a positive effect on U.S. 
banking by targeting the “underbanked” and “unbanked” and providing them with much-needed 
financial services, such as bank accounts and financing.  Consumers would benefit from a Wal-
 
 260. Joe Adler, Review 2007/Preview 2008: ILC Bill’s Prospects Wane as Sense of Urgency 
Fades, Am. Banker, Dec. 31, 2007, at 1.  George Sutton, the Utah representative for the ILC 
industry, argues however, “industrial banks have made it clear that they would agree to a 
prohibition on branching by a commercially owned industrial bank . . . .  That essentially 
precludes Wal-Mart from doing what everybody was afraid they would do in the future.”  Id. 
 261. Garver, supra note 94, at 1. 
 262. Id.; see also Weston, supra note 50 (noting, for example, that for a wire transfer to Mexico, 
Wal-Mart charges $10 compared to $14.99 at Western Union). 
 263. Weston, supra note 50. 
 264. Id. 
166 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63 
Mart bank because Wal-Mart could provide banking services at lower prices to a largely 
overlooked clientele.265  For example, Wal-Mart has been providing the same banking services 
that it provided to their employees to a low-income, largely Hispanic population not served by 
traditional banks.266 
A Wal-Mart bank could be large and competitive without being unfair or unsafe, and it could 
be an adequate competitor to the large banks that currently have the majority of the market 
power in our banking system.267  In fact, it seems to be the fear of fair competition driving some 
of the opposition to ILCs.  Lawrence White testified before Congress:  
The executives of small banks have a history of claiming dire consequences every 
time a state legislature contemplated allowing expanded intra-state branching 
privileges . . . .  [D]espite the consolidation, [however,] thousands of new (de 
novo) banks have been formed over the past few decades, as enterprising bankers 
have seen and embraced new business opportunities, often in the wake of 
mergers. . . .  A similar pattern could be expected if an expanded Wal-Mart bank 
were to leave the financial needs of groups of customers unfulfilled.  False 
 
 265. See Michael Barbaro & Eric Dash, At Wal-Mart, a Back Door Into Banking, N.Y. Times, 
June 21, 2007, at C1. 
 266. Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century 
161–62 (2007). 
 267. Wilmarth, supra note 257, 963–1050 (stating that banking has experienced a massive 
conglomeration as a result of current banking crisis and that a few large and powerful firms now 
control the majority of market share). 
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America’s bankers may not like the competition; but they are creative and 
resourceful, and most will survive.268 
c. Fear of Conglomerates and Monopolies 
The fear of monopolies has been an argument against the mixing of banking and commerce 
since the start of banking and has “great populist appeal.”269  Critics fear that the “mixing of 
banking and commerce could promote the formation of very large conglomerate enterprises with 
substantial amounts of economic power.  If these institutions were able to dominate some 
 
 268. White Testimony, supra note 48, at 219; see also Powell Remarks, supra note 158 (“Many 
worry about competition in the future that may come from new entrants into the ILC 
environment.  I understand these fears.  After all, I was a community banker once and I know all 
too well the pressures these institutions feel every day . . . . [W]hile I understand the anxiety 
some people have on this issue, fear of competition should not be the compelling argument in 
formulating good public policy.”). 
 269. “[This argument] can be traced back at least to Andrew Jackson’s ‘war’ in the 1830s 
against the Second Bank of the United States, and elements of the argument were already present 
in the debates concerning the chartering of the nation’s first banks during the late 18th and early 
19th centuries.”  Huertas, supra note 1, at 748.  For modern arguments focused on the fear of a 
concentration of power, see James Leach, The Mixing of Commerce and Banking, in The 
Mixing of Banking & Commerce, supra note 157, at 13, 18 (“fundamentally what is at issue is 
a concentration of power”).  See also Fine, supra note 241, at 29 (“That nagging doubt in the 
back of everyone’s mind over missing banking and commerce is our collective culture’s deep 
distrust of concentrated power in any one or few hands.”). 
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markets, such as the banking market in a particular local area, they could impact the access to 
bank services and credit for customers in those markets.”270  Although concern with power 
concentration is legitimate, addressing such concerns through limiting activities or restricting 
affiliations is “a blunt instrument approach” that denies the competitive benefit of new entrants 
into the system.271  Thomas Huertas addressed this contention when it arose two decades ago:  
It is instructive to note that in the bank war of the 1830s, great numbers won out 
over great size, and that generally remains the rule in politics today.  Fears that 
free entry into financial services would result in excessive political power seem 
overdrawn. . . .  Any law that restricts entry confers wealth on the people owning 
the entities that are protected from competition, and this tends to create a 
constituency in favor of the law.272 
Other scholars have also criticized the assertion that the mixing of banking and commerce 
would lead to large conglomerates with excessive economic power.273  Given the structure of our 
 
 270. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 72–73; see also Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 128 
(“Congress expressed concern that allowing banks and commercial firms to affiliate with each 
other could lead to the concentration of economic power in a few very large conglomerates.”). 
 271. Muckenfuss & Eager, supra note 157, at 52. 
 272. Huertas, supra note 1, at 748 (citing George G. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 1 Bell J. Econ. Mgmt. Sci., 3–21 (1971)). 
 273. See generally Nisreen H. Darwish & Douglas D. Evanoff, The Mixing of Banking and 
Commerce: A Conference Summary, Chi. Fed. Letter, Nov. 2007, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2007/cflnovember2007
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economy and our antitrust laws, they feel that this argument is misplaced.274  Competition from 
outsiders into the banking market can be beneficial to customers, especially to those underserved 
by existing banks.  It is interesting to examine the critiques against conglomerates given our 
current economic climate where banks have been forced to join together either by federal 
mandate or by market pressure, a process that has saved many banks from collapse.275  In the last 
year, the banking sector has seen an unprecedented rate of conglomeration among BHCs.276  
Many small banks have failed, and large banks have joined together to seek stability.277  This is 
ironically a result of the BHC Act, which was formed to prevent conglomeration.278  Banks have 
been forced to merge with one another because of capital and stability concerns, and due to the 
BHC Act restrictions, they can only join other banks or bank holding companies, causing a 
 
_244a.pdf. 
 274. Id. 
 275. JP Morgan Chase was forced to buy Bear Stearns; Barclays bought some of Lehman, 
JPMorgan Chase bought Washington Mutual, Wells Fargo bought Wachovia, etc.  See generally 
SOS: ‘Save Our Stocks’ A Look Back at a Year of Bailouts, Underwater Investors and Sunken 
Hopes, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R9–R11. 
 276. FDIC Failed Bank List, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
 277. See Eric Dash, Failures of Small Banks Grow, Straining F.D.I.C., N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 
2009, at A1; SOS, supra note 275, at R9–R11. 
 278. See Melanie L. Fein, Securities Activities of Banks 2–42 (3d ed. 2001). 
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conglomeration in banking.279 
Although it is often assumed that conglomerates present a threat to safe and fair banking, even 
before this current crisis, some have argued that conglomerates can provide substantial economic 
benefits.280  For example, John Hawkes, former U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, stated that, 
“conglomerate ownership of banking institutions particularly ownership by financial 
conglomerates properly managed and appropriately regulated and supervised can provide 
opportunities for greater profitability, can offer consumers significant advantages, and can add 
strength to the financial system.”281  In addition, there is no reason to presume that fewer large 
banks would lead to more failures than many small banks.  The 1987 and 2008 crises both led to 
many small banks failing, which had a devastating effect on the entire economy.282  Notably, the 
Canadian banking system, which has been one of the most healthy and resilient during the recent 
financial collapse, is structured around a few large banking conglomerates that are highly 
regulated and diversified.283  Many have recently suggested that the U.S. structure should mimic 
 
 279. See id. at 2–42; SOS, supra note 275, at R9–R11.  
 280. See generally John D. Hawke, Jr., Former U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks to 
the 16th Special Seminar on International Finance of the Japan Financial News Co., Ltd. (Nov. 
16, 2005).  
 281. Id. 
 282. Eric Lipton, F.D.I.C. Raises Fees to Replenish Bank Fund, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/us/politics/28web-banks.html.  
 283. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Good and Boring, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2010, at A19; Theresa 
Tedesco, Op-Ed, The Great Solvent North, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2009, at A23. 
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that of Canada and allow the nation’s banks to form conglomerates to avoid the failure of 
hundreds of small banks, as is currently anticipated.284 
d. Extension of the Federal Safety Net 
A principal concern in the mixing of banking and commerce is that it extends to commercial 
firms the federal safety net that the government designed specifically for banks.285  This 
argument assumes that commercial affiliations increase risk and that commercial firms are 
inherently more risky and prone to failure than banks.  There is little validity to this point.  In 
fact, it can be argued that it has been the banks that have taken excessive risks because they have 
been taking risks with their investors and depositors’ money with the full backing of the FDIC 
insurance fund and, ultimately, the protection of the Federal Reserve.286   
Still, critics argue that FDIC insurance would effectively act as a subsidy to save a commercial 
parent if the ILC or its parent is deemed “too big to fail.”287  Arthur Wilmarth, a vocal opponent 
 
 284. See Krugman, supra note 283; Tedesco, supra note 283. 
 285. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 8; ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at 99–101; Kohn 
Testimony, supra note 51, at 128; Jorde, supra note 224; Wilmarth, supra note 257, at 1079.  
 286. Piergiorgio Alessandri & Andrew G. Haldane, Bank of England, Banking on the 
State 8 (2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publicati 
ons/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf (arguing that banks have an incentive to take risks and be 
overleveraged because of the banking of the state). 
 287. A scenario often presented considers if Enron had an ILC.  Emil Lee, First Bank of Wal-
Mart?, Motley Fool (Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.fool.com/investing/value/2006/11/20/first-
bank-of-walmart.aspx.  See generally Consideration of Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing 
172 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63 
of the ILC, recently made this argument in opposing using TARP funds to bail out GMAC.288  
He argues that the federal government’s bailout of GMAC is an extension of the federal safety 
net to a nonfinancial industry.289  The argument rests on the fear that because the FDIC is not the 
primary regulator of the parent companies of financial firms, the FDIC “cannot monitor the 
business practices of the commercial owner or its affiliates to reveal potential risks to the 
soundness of the entire group or the ILC.”290  Opponents assume that if there were a problem at 
the parent level, the FDIC could not reach the parent, which would allow the bank to fail and 
lead to FDIC insurance being used to protect the entire organization.291  As previously discussed, 
the FDIC is armed with sufficient oversight and enforcement powers to prohibit certain 
ownership arrangements and to stop harmful activities of ILC commercial parents.292  If there is 
a potential for risk, the FDIC will prohibit bank ownership in the first place and, subsequently, 
take measures to reduce risk within a commercial-banking affiliation.293   
In addressing this fear, it is important to consider the ILC structure and its history of 
 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 338–40 (2004) 
(written testimony of Ed Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Protection, U.S. Public Interest 
Research Group & Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center). 
 288. See Wilmarth, supra note 137. 
 289. Id.  
 290. Ergungor & Thomson, supra note 42. 
 291. Id.  
 292. See Blair, supra note 70, at 109. 
 293. Id.  
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commercial ownership coupled with FDIC insured banks.  A review of the record demonstrates 
that FDIC funds have never been used to help an ILC with a commercial parent.294  Throughout 
the history of ILC existence, including the current financial crisis, not one commercially-owned 
ILC has failed or caused even one dollar of loss to the FDIC insurance fund.295  As the nation’s 
small and large banks are failing at a dramatic rate, the lack of any ILC failures stands in sharp 
contrast to the trend and testifies to the charter’s stability.  Consequently, ILCs do not pose any 
more risk to the deposit fund than any other commercial firm.  The GAO Report concluded 
“from an operations standpoint, ILCs do not appear to have a greater risk of failure than other 
types of insured depository institutions.”296  Past failures of ILCs have not been caused by their 
commercial affiliations but rather “from faulty strategic or tactical decisions.”297 
One study concludes that there would not be any significant trickling out of FDIC funds to 
banking affiliates if banks were more integrated with commercial firms.298  Moreover, the author 
states that it is likely that “under the current regulatory regime much or all of any safety net 
subsidy is already trickling out to commercial borrowers” because, in a competitive industry, any 
 
 294. See West, supra note 9, at 6–8. 
 295. Leary Remarks, supra note 19, at 191–92; see also Telephone Interview with Darryle 
Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the State of Utah (Dec. 2, 2009); Failed Bank List, 
FDIC http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
 296. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 24. 
 297. Blair, supra note 70, at 114.   
 298. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 6–7. 
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reduction in cost is passed through to customers in the form of lower prices.299   
If policymakers want to eliminate the subsidy altogether, they could reprice deposit insurance 
to take into effect the trickling out of the benefit across the market.300  Another measure to 
protect FDIC insurance would be to establish cross-guarantee liability for commercial owners as 
well as affiliates of ILCs, whereby the commercial owner and all of its affiliates would have to 
pay any deposit insurance liabilities before any money from the FDIC insurance fund is used.301   
 
 299. Id. at 7. 
 300. Since deposit insurance does not base premiums on risk exposure, there is a need to 
monitor and limit the risk-taking activities of insured banks.  In the absence of such oversight, 
the incentives created by mispricing may result in excessive losses to the insurance fund. FDIC, 
Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 109.  For an analysis of the problems facing the deposit 
insurance system, see Huertas, supra note 1, at 752–55. 
 301. Currently, the ILC owner is liable for losses, but affiliates of that owner are not.  Letter 
from Donald Powell, Chairman, FDIC, to Robert F. Bennett, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2003), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/future_bennett.html (“[a]s part of the Federal 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Congress 
established a system that generally permits the FDIC to assess liability across commonly 
controlled institutions for FDIC losses caused by the default of one of the institutions.  Currently, 
cross-guarantee liability is limited to insured depository institutions that are commonly 
controlled as defined in the statute.  The definition of ‘commonly controlled’ limits liability to 
insured depository institutions that are controlled by the same depository institution holding 
company, i.e., either a bank holding company or a savings and loan holding company.  Since the 
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Admittedly, ILCs are susceptible to all of the risks and mismanagement of a parent 
commercial firm.302  Further, commercial activities “provide a host of ways for [banks] to 
increase risk.”303  For example, a troubled bank could hide its poor assets on the books of a 
commercial parent, or an ailing commercial parent could potentially cause the demise of its 
affiliate bank.  However, in over two decades of commercial ownership of ILCs, this has not 
happened.304  Commercial firms have failed without affecting their ILCs largely due to effective 
regulation and regulatory firewalls.305 
e. Systemic Risk and the Stability of the ILC Model 
Most opponents of the ILC and the mixing of banking and commerce claim that allowing 
commerce and banking to mix increases systemic risk in the banking industry.306  Recent 
 
parent company of an ILC is neither a bank holding company nor a savings and loan holding 
company, ILCs that are owned by the same parent company would not be ‘commonly 
controlled.’ As a result, cross-guarantee liability may not attach to ILCs that are owned by the 
same parent company.”). 
 302. Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 128; Raskovich, supra note 44, at 8. 
 303. John Krainer, The Separation of Banking and Commerce, Fed. Res. Bank of San Fran. 
Econ. Rev., 2000, at 23. 
 304. See Leary Remarks, supra note 19, at 191–92. 
 305. Id.  
 306. The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 698 Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 84 (2007) (prepared statement of Arthur R. Connelly, 
First Vice Chairman of America’s Community Bankers). 
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congressional testimony by America’s Community Bankers states: “These risks [of preferential 
lending and other support for commercial affiliates], combined with the rapid growth of ILCs 
create systemic risk concerns.”307  The GAO report claimed that because ILCs have not been 
tested during a time of “economic stress,” it could still be assumed that they increased systemic 
risk.308  In the absence of comprehensive studies to determine the systemic risk of ILCs, the 
current crisis has served as an excellent “testing ground” for identifying risky banking structures.  
The ILC industry has been vindicated through its success and stability, while other banks have 
faltered by the hundreds.309  
Recent and historic examples demonstrate that when a parent commercial firm faces financial 
trouble and even bankruptcy, their ILCs do not suffer.310  When Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. 
 
 307. Muckenfuss & Eager, supra note 157, at 40, 55 n.7 (citing written Testimony of America’s 
Community Bankers on the Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007 before the 
Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives (ILCs—A Review of 
Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Financial 
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 309. Failed Bank List; see also Lipton, supra note 282 (stating that more banks have failed in 
the first quarter of 2009 than in 2008 and predicting that over 100 banks will fail in 2009). 
 310. See generally John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Financial 
Crisis, The New Yorker, Dec. 1, 2008, available at 
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(Lehman Brothers) failed, Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, stated that even if the Board of Governors wanted to save the firm, they could not do so 
because the problems were too deep and Lehman’s pledged collateral was essentially 
worthless.311  Nevertheless, when Lehman Brothers fell apart, their ILC remained sound.312  
Darryle Rude, the industrial bank supervisor for the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, 
explains:  
The industrial bank is very safe and sound. It is well capitalized and liquid, and 
has very good earnings. While other banks have been suffering over the last 
several quarters, Lehman Brothers Commercial Bank actually has been 
 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/12/01/081201fafact_cassidy?current page=all. 
 311. Id. (“Remarkably, once the potential bidders dropped out, Bernanke and Paulson never 
seriously considered mounting a government rescue of Lehman Brothers.  Bernanke and other 
Fed officials say that they lacked the legal authority to save the bank.  ‘There was no mechanism, 
there was no option, there was no set of rules, there was no funding to allow us to address that 
situation,’ Bernanke said last month, at the Economic Club of New York.  ‘The Federal 
Reserve’s ability to lend, which was used in the Bear Stearns case, for example, requires that 
adequate collateral be posted. . . . In this case, that was impossible—there simply wasn’t enough 
collateral to support the lending. . . . With Bear Stearns, with all the others, there was a point 
when someone said, “Mr. Chairman, are we going to do this deal or not?” With Lehman, we 
were never anywhere near that point.  There wasn’t a decision to be made.’”); see also infra note 
313 and accompanying text. 
 312. See John Cassidy, supra note 311. 
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performing very well . . . . We have lived through this scenario before where a 
parent company has filed bankruptcy, and the subsidiary bank was disposed of in 
an orderly fashion.313  
Since the bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers’ ILC has converted to Woodlands Commercial Bank.  
Although, it faces struggles similar to most banking institutions in the country, it is still 
operating.314  
Other prominent examples of situations where the bankruptcy of a parent did not affect its ILC 
are Conseco, Inc. (“Conseco”), Tyco International Ltd. (“Tyco”), and more recently, Flying J, 
Inc.  When Conseco filed for bankruptcy, its ILC remained solvent and healthy.315  In fact, the 
 
 313. Joe Adler, What Moves Mean for I-Banks’ Thrifts and ILCs, Am. Banker, Sept. 16, 2008, 
at 3. 
 314. Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Seeks to Inject Cash to Save Banks from Regulators, Dow 
Jones Financial Informational Services, Feb. 12, 2009. 
 315. The following is the FDIC summary of the Conseco failure: “Despite the financial troubles 
of its parent and the parent’s subsequent bankruptcy . . . Conseco Bank’s corporate firewalls and 
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bank’s safety and soundness.  In fact, $323 million of the $1.04 billion dollars received in the 
bankruptcy sale of Conseco Finance was in payment for the insured ILC — Conseco Bank, 
renamed Mill Creek Ban — which was purchased by GE Capital.  As a testament to the Conseco 
Bank’s financial health at the time of sale, the $323 million was equal to the book value of the 
bank at year-end 2002.” See Blair, supra note 70, at 114.  For the GAO’s discussion of Conseco, 
see GAO Report, supra note 10, at 69.   
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Conseco ILC was sold for a profit in the orderly liquidation of the insurance company.316  As 
Tyco was failing, the state of Utah took control of its ILC and sold it in an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) without the ILC’s assets suffering any loss.317  Tyco’s former ILC was purchased by CIT 
bank, and that bank also survived the failure of its parent company.318  A more recent example is 
Flying J, Inc., which is the largest retailer of diesel fuel in the West.319 When the company 
entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy due to fuel price fluctuations, its ILC, Transportation Alliance 
Bank, was unaffected and its balance sheets remained strong.320  The parent company, although 
in Chapter 11, remains a source of strength for the bank.321  
Not only have ILCs not suffered because of their failing parents, they have also been aided by 
 
 316. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the State of 
Utah, (Jan. 28, 2009); see also Blair, supra note 70, at 114. 
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 319. See generally Company History of Flying J Inc., Funding Universe, 
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visited July 22, 2010). 
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 321. Id.  
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their commercial parents, even those that have weakened.  The relative safety of these ILCs in 
times of financial stress is mainly due to the ILCs’ commercial alliances, their access to a deep 
pool of funds from their parents, and the ability of each ILC’s financing arm to function 
independently from its commercial parent.322  They are independent from their parents because 
their operations, assets, and liabilities are separate from their commercial parents—a separation 
enforced by regulators.323  But they can rely on their commercial parent in times of need for 
access to capital.324  This relationship exists because of their parents’ diversified products and 
because each large commercial parent has a vested interest in its bank’s survival. 325  If the bank 
falters, the commercial firm will have to pay before the federal government pays, which is not 
the structure of most BHCs that do not have an independent source of funds besides their 
subsidiary banks.  
Perhaps the most illustrative example of the protection offered by the ILC model in a time of 
financial trouble is the case of General Electric (GE) and its ILC, GE Capital, Inc. GE has 
suffered significant losses in the last several years and GE’s ILC has also suffered due to 
 
 322. See Letter from Donald Powell, supra note 301.  (Chairman, FDIC on The Future of 
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defaulting loans in its portfolio.326  GE’s ILC and its parent have an income maintenance 
agreement wherein the GE parent funnels cash to its financing arm when it falls below a 
threshold.327  They injected $9.5 billion in the first quarter of 2009 and will continue to support 
the ILC.328  The stable earnings of the parent company stand behind the ILC’s debt and allows 
the ILC to withstand losses of assets in its portfolio.  However, GE’s ILC has its own customers 
and independently originates loans for many small- and medium-sized businesses.329  GE’s ILC, 
headquartered in Salt Lake City, is now the forty-sixth most profitable bank in the country in 
spite of GE’s trouble.330  Most ILCs have similar income maintenance agreements, and several 
have been aided by their parent companies in the last two years during times of significant 
financial pressure.331 
It is not unique for a parent company to aid its subsidiary bank during a system-wide financial 
crisis.  The failure of thrifts in the 1980s is also instructive in examining relationships between 
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parent companies and their subsidiary financial institutions.332  During that crisis, many 
commercial parents of thrifts were able to aid failing thrifts through capital infusions without 
suffering themselves.333  Lawrence White, a member of the FHLBB, examined the crisis after he 
left office.  In discussing savings-and-loan holding companies during the crisis, White concludes, 
“[t]he presence of companies involved in markets as diverse as autos, steel, wood products, 
retailing, public utilities, insurance and securities as holding company owners of thrifts has not 
created problems; the same would surely be true if these, or similar, companies had owned 
banks.”334 
Commercial entities do not pose a greater risk than financial parents.335  Instead of increasing 
systemic risk, I argue that the commercial partnership arrangements of ILCs reduce risks within 
banks and the system as a whole.  If ILCs are expanded, there is always a possibility of 
unforeseeable risks that do not currently exist.  But if it could be proved that the ILC created 
additional risks to the financial system, the question should center on the regulators’ ability to 
 
 332. During the thrift crisis in California in the 1980s, commercial parents of thrifts served as 
an important source of capital.  Muckenfuss & Eager, supra note 157, at 48 n.61.  
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manage such risks.  Sheldon Woods, the President of the Association of Financial Services, 
stated that: 
[I]f the FDIC and the state of Utah can’t effectively manage the risk associated 
with any [ILC applicant], then that is where the question lies . . . . If that risk 
cannot be effectively managed, then [our] position would be [that] we support the 
regulatory environment and [ILC applications] should not be approved.336  
As discussed, the risks are minimal and ILC regulators are competently managing those risks.337 
C. Moving to a Better Regulatory Approach 
In 2008 the Treasury proposed a “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” 
that describes the current regulatory system as an outdated structure that needs to evolve to meet 
the demands of the changing market.  The fact sheet states:  
The current regulatory framework for financial institutions is based on a structure 
that has been largely knit together over the past 75 years. It has evolved in an 
accretive way in response to problems without any real focus on overall mission: 
Congress established the national bank charter in 1863 during the Civil War, the 
Federal Reserve System in 1913 in response to various episodes of financial 
instability, and the federal deposit insurance system during the Great Depression. 
 
 336. Lloyd, supra note 94, at 242 (citing Industry Outlook: Banking & Finance, Utah Bus., 
Mar. 2007, at 67, 72). 
 337. “We at the FDIC must all be vigilant in our supervisory role.  But I will reiterate: The 
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Changes were made to the regulatory structure in the intervening years in 
response to other financial crises (e.g., the thrift crises of the 1980s) or as 
enhancements (e.g., the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999), but for the most part 
the underlying structure resembles what existed in the 1930s. . . .  
Capital markets and the financial services industry have evolved significantly 
over the past decade.  Globalization and financial innovation, such as 
securitization, have provided benefits to domestic and global economic growth; 
while highlighting new risks to financial markets. . . . 
These developments are pressuring the U.S. regulatory structure, exposing 
regulatory gaps and redundancies, and often encouraging market participants to 
do business in other jurisdictions with more effective regulation. As a result, the 
U.S. regulatory structure reflects an antiquated system struggling to keep pace 
with market developments while facing increasing challenges to anticipate and 
prevent today’s financial crises.338 
The comprehensive Dodd–Frank bill, which was passed following the public sentiments for 
change articulated in this pronouncement, fell short of modernizing today’s banking system.  
What it effected, more modestly, was a regulatory clean-up and tinkering rather than a 
conceptual re-thinking of the structure of banking.  The separation of commerce and banking is 
one of these outdated ideas that needs to be reexamined in light of recent events.  To operate 
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2010] The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking 185 
properly, the financial regulatory structure must understand the changing nature of the banking 
market.  The strict separation between commerce and banking does not reflect such an 
understanding.  As the nature of banks and banking has changed over the last several decades, 
policymakers should reconsider the separation between commerce and banking. 
IV: BENEFITS OF MIXING BANKING AND COMMERCE 
A. The Current Financial Crisis 
The credit crisis that has debilitated many of our nation’s financial institutions has 
demonstrated how quickly a contagion can spread through our nation’s banks.  Many banks have 
similar types of assets and loans, and when one source of capital is troubled, such as 
collateralized debt obligations linked to mortgage-backed securities, all of the banks experience a 
similar loss.339  Some institutions are more at risk than others, but when one large institution at 
the center of the country’s financial system fails, it sends a ripple throughout the entire economy 
threatening to topple all the other financial institutions from which they have borrowed money 
and to whom they have served as a source of credit.340  Many likened the initial banking collapse 
of 2008 to dominos or a house of cards to illustrate how interconnected the financial institutions 
have become and how prone to collapse they are when one party falters.341  In effect, the crisis 
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Implications for Financial Stability and Regulation 3 (Ctr for Econ. Research, Discussion Paper 
No. 2006-72) (arguing that banks have become increasingly homogenized). 
 340. See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Has No Quick Fix for Banks, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 21, 2009, at B1. 
 341. News Hour (PBS television broadcast Mar. 21, 2008) (Jim Lehrer used falling dominos to 
186 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63 
showed that a better source of strength for a bank is an entity whose liquidity is not dependent on 
the same infected financial system, rather than a financial holding company whose instability is 
directly correlated with the instability of the bank.342  The current crisis has forced the Federal 
Reserve and Treasury, the only sources of stable liquidity, to step in and provide aid and capital 
for troubled institutions.343 
Indeed, there is a need for a more stable source of capital, or uncorrupted assets, to stop the 
domino effect.  In February 2008, the investment firm Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (Bear 
 
describe the fallout of the financial system); House of Cards (CNBC television broadcast Aug. 
16, 2008), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/28892719 (CNBC used a “House of Cards” 
analogy in describing the events).  
 342. Many of the institutions that failed or were bailed out to avert failure, such as Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual, were either BHCs or large investment 
banking institutions that experienced the same vulnerabilities as banks, such as a “run” on their 
assets.  AIG is an insurance company whose activities closely mirrored those of these large 
banks.  The banks that were most damaged had all invested heavily in the subprime housing 
market.  Some were over-leveraged, and their risks and vulnerabilities were not diversified.   
 343. James Rowley & Nicholas Johnston, Bailout Bill Sent Back to House After Senate 
Passage, Bloomberg (Oct. 2, 2008, 8:24 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aFnvkteaver8; Ronald 
D. Orol, Treasury, Fed unveil $1.5 trillion rescue plan, MarketWatch (Feb. 10, 2009, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/treasury-fed-unveil-15-trillion-rescue; Deborah Solomon, 
Market Pans Bank Rescue Plan Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 2009, at A1. 
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Stearns) almost collapsed overnight as it lost the confidence of its investors and, most 
importantly, its creditors before another investment bank, JP Morgan, saved it at the behest of the 
Federal Reserve.344  Because Bear Stearns operates on a typical investment firm model of high-
risk investments and short-term financing, once the downhill slide started, it was difficult to stop 
or even delay.345  Bear Stearns suffered a bank-like “run” on its assets because of its short-term 
liability structure.346  In the case of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve was forced to step in and 
stabilize the firm through a capital infusion and forced sale.347  But, perhaps this stabilizing force 
could have been a commercial parent or affiliate with more stable assets and revenue.  As 
opposed to a commercial owner, a traditional BHC rarely has its own assets and makes little to 
no contribution to the bank.348  Thus, holding companies have a very limited ability to save an 
ailing bank and are often nothing more than bystanders when their subsidiaries are in trouble. In 
 
 344. Landon Thomas Jr., JPMorgan and Fed Move to Bail Out Bear Stearns, N.Y. Times (Mar. 
14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/14/business/14cnd-bear.html. 
 345. Cassidy, supra note 311, at 62.  
 346. Many investment banks whose activities are financial in nature and based on short-term 
liabilities are structured such that they are susceptible to runs.  These firms are much like banks, 
but are not regulated like banks and are not supported by the FDIC.  But as seen in the recent 
crisis, many were bailed out by the Federal Reserve.  For an analysis of the “run” on investment 
banks that recently occurred, see generally Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating 
Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 183 (2009).  
 347. Cassidy, supra note 311, at 49. 
 348. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 52. 
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fact, George Sutton testified in Congress that he could 
recall only a few instances when the holding company made any difference in 
the fate of its subsidiary bank. In almost every case, the holding company had no 
ability to rescue the failing bank and was nothing more than a bystander. In 
contrast, diversified holding companies can make real contributions to their bank 
subsidiaries.349 
An example of a typical BHC structure is Citigroup.  With more than 200 subsidiaries that 
participate in BHC Act-sanctioned financial activities such as banking and insurance, Citigroup, 
the BHC parent, is a shell that depends on the revenue of its many subsidiaries.350  When the 
subsidiaries are troubled, the parent cannot aid them.  Thus, as the banking industry has come 
under intense credit pressure, Citigroup is struggling to keep its head above water.351  
Commercial firms, such as Wal-Mart, on the other hand, have a diversified business plan not 
dependent on the revenue from a banking subsidiary.  Banks and retail companies operate 
differently.  Banks have illiquid assets (loans) and highly liquid liabilities (deposits), which make 
them susceptible to runs.352  Furthermore, they are at the center of the economy’s payment 
 
 349. Id. at 207. 
 350. Major Financial Institutions, www.swlearning.com/pdfs/chapter/0324024207_3.PDF at 48. 
 351. See Eric Dash, U.S. Is Said to Agree to Raise Stakes in Citigroup, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 
2009, at A1. 
 352. The Financial Dictionary defines a bank “run” as follows: “A series of unexpected cash 
withdrawals caused by a sudden decline in depositor confidence or fear that the bank will be 
closed by the chartering agency, i.e. many depositors withdraw cash almost simultaneously.  
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system and thus have constant relationships and entanglements with other banks, exposing them 
to losses at each other’s hands.  It is easy to see how a contagion, such as troubled mortgage-
backed securities, can topple an entire financial system.  On the other hand, retail companies 
operate through medium- and long-term debt and are not collateralized by assets that can lose 
their value quickly.  Even troubled commercial or industrial companies slide slowly into 
bankruptcy.  In contrast, in September 2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in a matter of days 
once it lost the confidence of clients and creditors.353  The Federal Reserve could not stop this 
giant firm from falling, and some claim that the fall of Lehman Brothers was the straw that broke 
the back of our financial system—in a matter of days.354  On the other hand, the U.S. automakers 
have grappled with financial difficulties for years and are close to, or have already declared, 
bankruptcy.355  However, they have assets of significant value, and their distress has not had the 
tremendously damaging effect on U.S. and world markets that Lehman Brothers’ collapse 
caused.  
 
Since the cash reserve a bank keeps on hand is only a small fraction of its deposits, a large 
number of withdrawals in a short period of time can deplete available cash and force the bank to 
close and possibly go out of business.”  Financial Dictionary, http://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Run+on+the+bank (last visited May 25, 2010). 
 353. Cassidy, supra note 271, at 49. 
 354. James Surowiecki, Hazardous Materials?, The New Yorker, Feb. 9, 2009, at 40. 
 355. Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Automakers Fear a New Normal of Low Sales, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 6, 2009 at B1; Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy; UAW and Fiat 
to take Control, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2009, at A1. 
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Commercial companies can encounter problems, but these are largely unrelated to the 
problems of the financial community, though commercial companies can be affected when the 
financial system is damaged.356  The assets of Ford Motor Company, for example, will not 
disappear as quickly as those of Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns did.  Ford will not suffer a 
“run” on its assets.  They have and will struggle to balance their assets with their liabilities for 
months or years without a sudden unexpected collapse.  Wal-Mart, for example, reported an 
annual revenue of $404 billion dollars for 2009.357  A healthy firm, such as Wal-Mart, on even a 
troubled automaker, can serve as a stable source of capital when a sudden collapse has shaken a 
financial system.  As the recent crisis demonstrates, government regulation and oversight does 
not ensure safety,358 but a stable source of capital always will.  A commercial firm is still 
vulnerable to systemic shocks, but diversifying the sources of capital in a financial system can 
lower the risks most banks and investment firms face when the market suddenly sours. 
 
 356. See Stephanie Rosenbloom, Sales Fall Sharply for Retailers Not Named Wal-Mart, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 6, 2009, at B3.  
 357. Wal-Mart, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wal-Mart (last visited Aug. 10, 2010). 
 358. There is a lot of finger pointing among policymakers as to which regulator is to blame.  
The Federal Reserve has blamed the SEC’s inadequate governing of the major investment banks 
through their Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) program, and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and FDIC have also been blamed.  See John Sandman, CSE 
Program A Failed Experiment, Sec. Tech. Monitor, Jan. 19, 2009, at 4.  Unfortunately, as we 
have seen in the past, lawmakers will most likely respond to the crisis with added regulation that 
may increase oversight or activities restrictions, but will also likely miss the mark.   
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With the nation’s banks on the brink, the federal government has served as a stopgap to 
prevent (or delay) collapse.  There is another solution.  Stable commercial entities can step in to 
stop the hemorrhaging of our nation’s banks.  In the short term, failing banks can be converted 
into ILCs and sold to commercial firms who can revive them, thereby avoiding bank liquidations 
or expensive government intervention.359  In the long-term, policymakers should use the 
successful ILC model as a guide as they begin to reshape banking in the following months and 
years.360  
With respect to ILCs, most of their holding companies are many times larger than their ILC 
subsidiaries and could rescue their ILCs from even catastrophic losses that would otherwise 
 
 359. The FDIC has already shown a desire and willingness to allow private non-BHC investors 
to buy and help aid failing banks.  In August of 2009, the FDIC launched a program to invite 
private equity firms to buy and control banks without being subject to BHC Act restrictions.  See 
FDIC, Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions (2009), 
available at www.fdic.gov/news/board/Aug26no2.pdf; see also Carl Gutierrez, FDIC Gives 
Private Equity a Break, Forbes (Aug. 26, 2009 6:30 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/26/fdic-bair-banking-markets-equities-private-equity.html. 
 360. Ben Bernanke, in an address to Chicago Federal Reserve, said, “Looking forward, the 
Federal Reserve, other regulators, and the Congress must evaluate what we have learned from 
the recent [sub-prime mortgage crisis] and decide what additional regulation or oversight may be 
needed to prevent a recurrence.” Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Special Address at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: 
Subprime Mortgage Market 5 (May 2007) (on file with author). 
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debilitate a freestanding bank.  “Nothing in the Federal Reserve’s array of powers can protect 
against a bank’s failure better than a capital maintenance agreement with a diversified parent” of 
a banking subsidiary.361  The ILC model has demonstrated how a commercial firm can serve as a 
backup source of liquidity to prevent a bank from collapsing.  When ILCs encounter problems, 
their large commercial parents can infuse capital into the banks in a matter of hours, thereby 
stabilizing them and allowing them to function through a threatening credit shortage that would 
debilitate an unaffiliated commercial bank.362  
A practical criticism for allowing more integration between commerce and banking is that 
while Wal-Mart and other commercial firms may know about the retail or auto business, their 
market dominance and superiority does not encompass banking.363  In other words, Wal-Mart is 
good at retail, but what does it know about banking?  This criticism assumes that the same 
people that run the retail operation would also run the bank.  However, that management 
structure is impermissible under state charter restrictions.364  Utah, for example, requires that the 
management executives of all ILCs have extensive bank management experience.365  The state 
 
 361. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 207.   
 362. George Sutton gave an example of Morgan Stanley’s ILC asking for and receiving a $130 
million dollar capital infusion overnight.  Telephone Interview with George Sutton (Jan. 7, 
2009). 
 363. See ICBA Testimony, supra note 176. 
 364. These requirements are outlined in Utah’s Department of Financial Institutions website at 
www.dfi.utah.gov/FinInst.htm.   
 365. Id. 
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charter also requires that the board of directors be comprised of a majority of independent 
members.366  Al D. Melina, for example, was a top executive at Bank of America, a BHC, for 
over twenty years before he began managing GMAC’s ILC.367  BMW’s ILC chairman has been 
in the banking industry for over twenty-five years.368  For many of the companies that own ILCs, 
including GMAC, BMW, Ford, and Target, lending is not a new business.  Target launched the 
first in-store credit card over one hundred years ago in their Dayton Hudson store and has 
operated Target National Bank, which was grandfathered in through CEBA, for over fifteen 
years.369 
A potential risk in expanding the ILC model would be that the ILC subsidiary would become a 
larger entity than the commercial firm above it and control the business such that the commercial 
firm could not serve as a backup source of liquidity for the bank.  This structure would resemble 
a typical bank holding company, but with the added risk that the FDIC would be forced to step in 
and bail out the commercial parent.  However, this structure can be impeded by regulation, and it 
does not pose more of a risk to the banking system than the current BHC structure. 
B. Economic Benefits 
In addition to a general stabilizing effect, studies have shown that there are also benefits to the 
broader economy when banking and commerce are allowed to mix.370  Bank diversification 
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 370. See, e.g., Huertas, supra note 1; FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 283. 
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reduces operating costs and can result in more efficient management of different financial 
transactions.371  Achieving a lower cost of production by increasing the scale of production is 
referred to as economies of scale.372  Reducing costs by coordinating various products within one 
organization is referred to as economies of scope.373  Thomas Huertas states:  
Financial services are particularly likely to be characterized by economies of 
scope, for information is a key factor in the production of financial services. . . . 
For example, many of the same data needed to grant a mortgage can be used to 
sell homeowner’s insurance.  The firm that offers both services need collect the 
information only once and can pass the resultant cost savings along to the 
consumer.374  
Huertas argues that the mixing of banking and commerce would eliminate the market power 
 
 371. See generally, FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 2; Raskovich, supra note 
44; Huertas, supra note 1. 
 372. See Economies of Scale Definition, The Linux Information Project, 
http://www.linfo.org/economies_of_Scale.html (last visited July 22, 2010). 
 373. Economies of scope arise when a factor needed to produce one product can be used at little 
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the products separately.  Huertas, supra note 1, at 746–47. 
 374. Huertas, supra note 1, at 747. 
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that our current financial system confers on financial firms and that the increased competition 
would allow financial firms to develop more comprehensive financial services that would result 
in improved convenience and reduced prices.375  He also demonstrates that limits on entry into 
any sector increases transaction costs and service fees.376   
A relevant study analyzed the success of banks that entered a market through a Wal-Mart store 
compared with banks that entered a market in other ways.377  The study found that banks located 
within Wal-Mart stores, though not owned by Wal-Mart, experience more rapid growth in 
deposits.378  This study suggests that the “one-stop shopping” approach to banking could lead to 
increased market efficiencies.   
Another study used corporate tax returns to conclude that bank holding companies could 
double their average return on assets, without any increase in risk, by investing in the following 
diversified portfolio: “55% asset value in banking, 14% in retail, 13% in non-bank financial 
 
 375. Id.  
 376. “[L]imits on entry into investment banking tend to raise the underwriting fees that issuers 
must pay to float new securities.” Id. at 746.   
 377. Robert M. Adams et al., The Value of Location in Bank Competition: Examining the 
Effect of Wal-Mart Branches, in The Mixing of Banking & Commerce, supra note 157, at 84, 
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 378. Id. at 88.  
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services, 8% in wholesale, and 6% in construction.”379  The study concludes that increasing 
returns could have been accomplished with minimum risk by combining banks with one of the 
construction, retail, or wholesale sectors and that the potential benefits from banking 
diversification appear to be quite significant.380   
Although the United States is one of the most restrictive banking regimes in the world and has 
limited data on the effects of mixing banking and commerce, studies done abroad clearly 
demonstrate the economic benefits of this mixture.381  In the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU, 
for example, most commercial firms, including United States firms, own banks because there is 
no prohibition against a commercial firm owning a bank.382  The EU defines a bank widely as 
 
 379. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 9; Id. (citing Larry D. Wall et al., The Last Frontier: The 
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“an institution that grants credit for its own account and receives deposits . . . from the public, 
and has a banking license . . . .”383  
Although many of these studies were conducted before the current financial crisis, which has 
largely reshaped banking, their findings are still persuasive.  A number of studies conducted on 
banks in Japan and Germany indicate that where commerce and banking are not separated, 
informational efficiencies lead to reduced transaction costs in doing business.384  A few studies 
have shown that distressed commercial firms with banking affiliates have performed better and 
overcome insolvency sooner than those without affiliations, resulting in lower financial distress 
for the firm as well as lower costs.385  Studies conducted in the United States have found that 
firms affiliated with banks perform better during reconstruction following bankruptcy than 
unaffiliated firms.386  And other studies have shown the positive effects of bankers being on the 
boards of commercial firms.387   
When banks and commercial firms have a close relationship, there is a better assessment of 
risk.  In Germany, firms held by banks performed better than those not affiliated with banks.388  
 
 383. Id. at 61. 
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In the U.S. system, where banks are not allowed to affiliate with commercial firms, a problem of 
“asymmetric information” arises, which can result in increased expenses.  A recent study 
examining the effect of informational asymmetries on the pricing and maturity of private debt 
contracts found that information asymmetries increase the costs of debt capital and decrease loan 
maturities in both private and public markets.389  Banks must engage in a time-consuming and 
costly due diligence process to gather information on borrowers before issuing credit.  While this 
process is useful and necessary, any reduction in these expenses would lower the cost of capital.  
Studies have shown that in countries where commercial entities and banks are more integrated, 
higher levels of information sharing has led to lower costs of capital and transaction costs.390   
A recent cross-country study looked at how the mixing of banking and commerce would affect 
loan pricing and found that integration could lead to better loan terms because of stronger lender-
borrower relationships and informational advantages that could lead to more efficient 
monitoring.391  Another study determined that “small business borrowers with longer banking 
relationships tend to pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral,”392 further 
demonstrating that informational efficiencies lead to reduced transaction costs.  When banks 
 
 389. Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, The Impact of Information Asymmetry on Debt Pricing and 
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have access to more information, they can more accurately price for risk and pass on a lower 
interest rate to the borrower.393  Through an ongoing lending relationship, a bank can obtain 
more accurate information about a firm’s credit risk.  In turn, this can lead to a better valuation of 
a firm and limit over pricing or underpricing, which is damaging to capital markets.  A 2004 
study found that “under-pricing is [about 17%] less severe for IPOs managed by banks that have 
a pre-IPO relationship with the firm going public.”394 
A comprehensive study conducted on banks across the world found no positive effects “from 
restricting the mixing of banking and commerce.”395  In fact, the study found that “restricting the 
mixing of banking and commerce is associated with greater financial fragility.”396  The 
“empirical results highlight the negative implications of imposing restrictions on the activities of 
commercial banks” and found “no countervailing positive benefits from restricting the mixing of 
banking and commerce.”397  
It is problematic to apply international studies to the United States’ financial system because 
the United States’ banking system is much larger and more complex than other financial 
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systems, but the studies do show that where commerce and banking have mixed, the results have 
been positive.398  In addition, many of these findings have been weakened as banks across the 
world, including those that were diversified, are now in severe distress.   
Thomas Huertas, advocating the mixing of banking and commerce in the United States, states 
that “technology and market developments are blurring the distinction between banks and non-
banks.”399  Huertas argues that the American system needs to catch up to the advances in the 
financial markets.400  Many commercial firms in America already participate in banking 
activities through commercial paper and private placements.  Many sources of credit and 
investments in commercial firms are essentially identical to banking activities.401  PayPal Inc., 
for example, is a commercial enterprise that has over one hundred million consumers and firms 
in over fifty countries.402  PayPal issues accounts that “enable [a] holder to send and receive 
payments, hold balances (that may be invested in a money market mutual fund) and withdraw 
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cash from ATMs.”403  “Mobile-phone companies issue pre-paid cards that [customers can use] to 
pay for telecom’s services and, increasingly, offer other goods and services as well.”404  Other 
businesses that previously did not intersect with banking have now developed financing arms in 
order to better serve customers and expand their reach.  One example is UPS Capital, which 
provides financing for small businesses developing their supply chain.405  UPS is just one 
example of a company that has found greater efficiency and an increased capacity to meet 
customer demand by engaging in banking activities.  Thus, commercial firms are already 
engaged in offering credit and accepting deposits—activities that were previously the domain of 
commercial banks.  And they are doing so because the global market seems to demand and 
reward more comprehensive business solutions and services.406 
Just as businesses are increasing efficiency by providing financing, research has also 
 
 403. Id.  Huertas notes that cash withdrawals at ATMs are only allowed at certain locations. 
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 405. Friedman, supra note 266, at 173 (“UPS was doing business with a small biotech company 
in Canada . . . [that was having a] problem keeping up with demand and could not get financing. 
. . . UPS redesigned the company’s system based around a refrigerator hub in Dallas and 
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demonstrated that when banks are integrated and their operations diversified, they are less likely 
to take risks.407  One study of the benefits of mixing and commerce concludes that “permit[ing] 
vertical integration between banks and commercial firms . . . would tend to raise bank profits 
while advancing economic efficiency by improving coordination between banks and commercial 
borrowers.”408  It is unlikely that risk can be eliminated from banking, and it is possible that 
commercial firms entering banking would introduce new and unforeseen risks as these 
partnerships were allowed to expand.  Nevertheless, there is a body of research that seems to 
support the proposition that allowing commercial firm ownership of ILCs could lead to increased 
stability and efficiency.409   
For the last several decades, ILCs with commercial parents have been a small, controlled 
arena to test the effects of mixing banking and commerce, and they have proven safe.  When 
analyzing the S&L debacle of the 1980s, a banking scholar noted: “[T]hese facts, at a minimum, 
support the conclusion that any correlation between ‘commercial’ control of a bank and safety-
and-soundness is strongly positive.”410  The ILC sector has also demonstrated this point.  
Problems at commercial-affiliated institutions have been very rare, and the FDIC fund has not 
borne losses.411 
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C. Utah ILCs 
Utah, home to most of the nation’s ILCs, has been an effective regulator, and the many ILCs 
thriving in the state have shown that commerce and banking can indeed mix with positive results 
and without heightened risk.  William M. Isaac, the former chairman of the FDIC, speaking on 
ILCs stated that “those who would restrict its operation should bear a significant burden of 
demonstrating the need for the restrictions . . . . Putting the Wal-Mart issue aside, there is not a 
thing wrong with the ILC industry or its regulation.”412  
As mentioned previously, no commercially owned ILC failure has caused a single dollar of 
loss to the FDIC insurance fund, and no Utah-based ILC (commercial or not) has ever failed.413  
Moreover, an FDIC study states that there are three variables affecting the probability of 
insolvency: the level of the capital–asset ratio, the level of returns, and the variability of 
returns.414  The higher the capital-asset ratio and the level of returns; on average, the lower the 
probability of failure is.415  Utah ILCs rank higher on all of these levels, on average, compared to 
most other states. 416  An analysis of banking figures released September 30, 2008, for state-
 
 412. William M. Isaac, Wal-Mart Issue No Reason to Hobble ILC Industry, Am. Banker, Mar. 
13, 2007, at 1. 
 413. Leary Testimony, supra note 19, at 7. 
 414. See FDIC, Mandate for Change, supra note 140, at 61. 
 415. Id. 
 416. I compare the capital ratios of Utah to other states for third quarter 2008.  Eighty percent 
of Utah’s state-chartered banks are ILCs, so the Utah statistics are a good indicator for the entire 
ILC industry.  State figures are available at FDIC State Profiles 2008, FDIC, 
204 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63 
chartered banks across the United States demonstrates that ILCs have higher capital–asset ratios 
and lower risk than most other state-chartered banks.417  Thus, Utah ILCs are among the 
healthiest banks in the country.  Although several of the twenty-seven Utah ILCs lost money in 
2008 and 2009, they remain well-capitalized overall and have good asset quality.418  
In addition to being well-capitalized and well-managed, the ILC industry makes important 
contributions to consumers with very minimal risk.419  In the history of ILCs, only two ILCs with 
parent companies have failed, and their parent companies were not commercial firms but 
financial corporations.420  It is noteworthy that these holding companies were financial 
 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/stateprofile/index.html (last visited July 24, 2010). 
 417. Id. 
 418. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, supra note 316. 
 419. See generally ILCs—A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues, supra note 
30, at 55 (testimony of John L. Douglas on behalf of the American Financial Services 
Association (AFSA). 
 420. The two institutions were Pacific Thrift and Loan and Security Pacific Bank.  See Press 
Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Approves the Assumption of the Insured Deposits of 
Pacific Thrift and Loan Company, Woodland Hills, California (Nov. 19, 1999), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/1999/pr9971.html);  Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., Pacific Western Bank Acquires All the Deposits of Security Pacific Bank, Los Angeles, 
California, (Nov. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08114.html; see also ILCs—A Review of Charter, 
Ownership, and Supervision Issues, supra note 307, at 100 n.20.  Between 1986 and 1996, there 
2010] The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking 205 
companies and not commercial firms.  These two failures cost the FDIC about $100 million and 
as John Douglas observes:  
Both failed not as a result of any self dealing, conflicts of interest or 
impropriety by their corporate owners; rather, they failed the “old fashioned 
way”—poor risk diversification, imprudent lending and poor controls.  These two 
failures stand in sharp contrast to the hundreds of bank failures that operated in 
holding company structures, many of which cost the FDIC billions of dollars.421 
The strength of Utah ILCs has to do with its sophisticated regulatory scheme and the diverse 
holding companies that own Utah ILCs.  The regulatory organizations have responded to 
potential failures on a number of occasions and helped ailing firms.422  It is the nature of ILCs 
that causes their success—they can receive capital very quickly, literally overnight, from their 
well-funded parents when they encounter problems.  This easy access to capital cannot be 
understated, as it is the most important factor for bank safety.  An ILC also benefits from its 
business relationship with the parent.  There are no marketing costs associated with ILCs 
because their business is often handed to them from their parent company.  Most parents 
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organize industrial banks to add value to an existing business, and as a result, the banks begin as 
profitable enterprises with few start-up costs and pitfalls.423  Most traditional banks only achieve 
this level of security and development after many years in operation.   
V. CONCLUSION  
On February 25, 2009, President Obama, addressing the financial regulatory system, stated, 
“we can no longer sustain . . . 21st century markets with 20th century regulations.”424  
Policymakers should reconsider regulation that bans the relationship between commerce and 
banking and should usher in a more open financial system through a new regulatory structure 
that acknowledges the advances of the last several decades.  Such openness between banking and 
commerce will require a new system of comprehensive oversight, which can be modeled after 
the successful ILC regulatory structure. 
The ILC has filled a much-needed role in the intersection between banking and commerce for 
many years and has met the market’s demand for flexibility in banking.  In addition, the current 
economic crisis has illustrated the danger of a non-diversified banking system.  The ILC 
structure is currently the only place where the stabilizing relationship between commerce and 
banking takes place and, as demonstrated, the small industry has remained sound through a 
systemic financial collapse largely due to its commercial relationships.   
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